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ABSTRACT 
Software development in weapon systems is extremely challenging and has 
become a significant source of problems in DOD programs. The purpose of this thesis 
is to identify and document strategies and techniques for program offices to use in 
managing these software problems. This thesis documents the success of the Enhanced 
Position Location Reporting System in applying corrective software management actions 
to specific problems encountered. Lessons learned have been drawn from the analysis 
and generalized for application to other DOD programs. The principal finding is that an 
effective software corrective action plan requires a focused effort devoted to identifying 
and correcting all deficiencies in the software. This is accomplished before further system 
development work requiring software is attempted. The thesis concludes that an astute 
program office should be prepared to implement and manage this type of software 
corrective action plan. Two primary recommendations are for the development of a DOD 
policy on the management of software corrective action and the development of a DOD 
model for software corrective action by program offices. 
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Over the past twenty years, the technological advancement of Department of 
Defense (DOD) weapon systems has relied heavily .on increasingly complex computer 
software. Management of the design and development of this software is extremely 
challenging and has become a major source of problems in the systems acquisition field. 
Program offices are commonly faced with problems in software acquisition that call for 
some type of corrective action. To date, little documentation exists that details successful 
strategies and techniques available to a program office for use in correcting problems 
encountered during software development. This study will document the success of one 
program office in applying corrective software management actions to specific problems 
encountered. Successful, general concepts and strategies for corrective software 
management can be captured from this case for use in future work. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
This thesis will examine corrective software management in the Enhanced Position 
Location and Reporting System (EPLRS) acquisition program of the Department of the 
Army. The specific corrective actions in software management for this program will be 
examined and identified. These actions will then be analyzed for their general 
application to software management problems during acquisition. The overall objective 
1 
of this thesis is to document the knowledge that will assist in developing successful 
strategies for dealing with software management problems. 
C. SCOPE 
This thesis will focus on the corrective action plan developed during the acquisition 
of the Army's Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS). The central 
concern will be the challenges faced by the product managers after poor technical test 
results in 1988 and 1989. The events leading up to the poor test results are not of direct 
concern in this thesis and will only be covered to an extent necessary to illustrate the 
need for corrective action. 
The perspective of this research and analysis will be managerial, not technical. 
Obviously, managers in this area must be adequately familiar with the technical aspects 
of their program to be successful. With this in mind, technical aspects of the EPLRS 
program will be presented as they apply to managerial decisions. 
This research focused on mission critical software. Mission critical software is a 
component of Mission Critical Computer Resources (MCCR), which refers to the totality 
of computer hardware and software integral to a weapon system. Section 908 of Public 
Law 97-86, also known as the Warner-Nunn Amendment, defined MCCR as those 
computer resources that perform the following functions, operations, or use: 
[Ref. 2:p. 4-3] 
1. Involves intelligence activities; 
2. Involves cryptoanalytic activities related to national security; 
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3. Involves the command and control of military forces; 
4. Involves equipment that is an integral part of a weapon system; 
5. Is critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions. 
The tenn 'MCCR system', when used in this document, refers to defense systems 
as defined above. Mission critical software excludes all administrative type computer 
software programs. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis was conducted as a case study. First, an historical overview of weapon 
system software acquisition was conducted. This was accomplished by reviewing 
material from professional manuals, periodicals, and previous theses. This provided the 
necessary background knowledge from an historical perspective from which to begin the 
case analysis. Analysis of the case required infonnation on the status of the program at 
various phases of its development, identity and roles of key personnel, decisions and 
subsequent actions that affected the program, and an evaluation of these actions. This 
infonnation was gathered through personal interviews with government personnel 
working directly and indirectly with the EPLRS program, and contractor personnel 
working on the EPLRS program for Hughes Aircraft Company. Additionally, pertinent 
documents from the EPLRS program office and Hughes Aircraft Company, and related 
periodicals and government reports were reviewed. 
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E. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter Il establishes the background for the study by overviewing the role of 
software in DOD acquisition programs. The chapter illustrates the history of software 
problems in DOD acquisition programs and will define the term "corrective software 
management." 
Chapter m describes the form of case study methodology used in this thesis. The 
chapter explains the applicability of the case study strategy to the thesis and illustrates 
the case study research design used. 
Chapter IV introduces the reader to the EPLRS system and the agencies responsible 
for it. It briefly details the history and acquisition strategy of the program. The chapter 
closes by describing the program technical testing that prompted corrective action for the 
system. 
Chapter V describes the corrective action used by the Government and the 
contractor to correct system deficiencies identified during technical testing. It presents 
the initial Government guidance, a review of the corrective action plan, and a discussion 
of the key actions taken by the Government and the contractor. The chapter also 
discusses the results of the corrective action. 
Chapter VI analyzes the events and decisions critical to the corrective action plan 
of the EPLRS program. Additionally, it will discuss the applicability of this case to 
other DOD programs. The chapter then presents a list of lessons learned from the 
EPLRS case that can be generalized to other DOD acquisition programs. 
4 
Chapter VII presents a conclusion of the analysis. The chapter also presents 
recommendations and answers to the research questions. The chapter will close with 




Software development as a recognized activity is relatively young. Its significant 
history with the DOD dates back less than 45 years when weapon systems used analog 
computers to automate basic functions. Software engineering is even younger, 
highlighted by the fact that computer science departments were just being established as 
separate entities in colleges in the late 1960's. It's defined as the technological and 
managerial discipline concerned with systematic production and maintenance of software 
products that are developed and modified on time and within cost estimates 
[Ref. l]. The term "Software Engineering" was first used in 1968. [Ref. 2] As 
an engineering discipline it is still in its infancy. This fact is illustrated by the scarcity 
and immaturity of the practices, procedures, and tools used in the software engineering 
field as compared to other engineering disciplines, many of which have evolved over a 
hundred years or more. 
Nonetheless, software development and engineering has progressed steadily during 
its lifetime. The introduction of digital systems in the mid 1950's greatly expanded the 
application of computers and software in military systems. Software's flexibility and cost 
effectiveness for change, as compared to computer hardware, has made it a desirable 
element in the development of DOD weapon systems. As a result, the demand for 
military software has increased rapidly during the last three decades. All of the services 
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have contributed to this demand by developing increased weapon system capability 
through the use of software. Examples of this wide variety of weapon systems include 
the Anny's M1A2 main battle tank, the Navy's Trident II missile, and the Air Force's 
B-lB bomber. E'.ach of these systems is software intensive. Today all major weapon 
systems are dependent upon software in some way. 
B. THE ROLE OF SOFfW ARE IN DOD WEAPON SYSTEMS 
1. General 
In 1987, the "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Military 
Software" described the role of military software in this way: 
Software plays a major role in today's weapon systems. The "smarts" of smart 
weapons are provided by software. Software is crucial to intelligence, 
communications, command, and control.[ ... ]Softwareprovides a major component 
of U.S. war-fighting capability.[Ref. 3] 
The use of embedded software provides the ability to change or increase the 
functionality and capabilities of a weapon system, often with little or no effect on the 
hardware characteristics. Software performs many of the critical functions in key 
weapon systems that cannot be performed by hardware alone. In essence, our key 
weapon systems today are completely dependent upon software to function properly. 
2. Software Size, Growth, and Complexity 
An objective of U.S. National Defense Strategy is to maintain technological 
superiority in weapon systems. [Ref. 4] The "high-tech" weapons that have 
evolved under this strategy during the last three decades have seen an exponential 
7 
growth in software costs as a percentage of total computer resource cost. As shown in 
Figure I, below, the ratio of computer resource costs in major weapon systems changed 
from 80 % hardware and 20 % software in 1960 to 20 % hardware and 80 % software in 










Figme 1. Life Cycle Cost Trends 
This growth in software cost has primarily been a result of the growth in the 
volume and complexity of software demanded by DOD. As weapon systems have 
become more capable and complex over the years, the software associated with them has 
grown dramatically. For example, the F-4 aircraft of the Vietnam war era had 
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practically no software. Today's F-14D aircraft currently relies on over 1 million source 
lines of code (SLOC) to perform its mission. And, in the near future, estimates predict 
that the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) will require approximately 7 million SLOC to 
operate. [Ref. 6] This represents an increase not only in volume, but also in 
software complexity. This complex software costs more to develop and support after 
fielding. Similar increases in software volume and complexity are evident in every 
category of system that depends upon Mission Critical Computer Resources (MCCR). 
The total volume of DOD software resulting from this demand is staggering. 
A technical report by the SEI estimated the DOD demand for Ada language alone in 
1989 was over 40 million lines of code requiring a rough estimate of over 9,000 person-
years of programming effort based on moderate code difficulty. [Ref. 7] This 
work estimated the number of lines of Ada programming code planned, in full scale 
development, and in the post deployment software support (PDSS) stage. Both figures 
are considered underestimates. When one considers the MCCR programs using 
languages other than Ada and the trend towards increasing software complexity and 
volume, the current amount of weapon system software is astonishing. 
3. Software Costs 
Producing this massive amount of weapon system software comes at no small 
cost to the Government. While cost data on DOD programs have been poorly tracked 
in the past, 1992 estimates of total software expenditures ranged from $24 billion to $32 
billion. This was approximately 8-11 % of the DOD budget for that year. In the next 
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15 years it is estimated that software may increase to an annual cost of $50 billion and 
account for up to 20 % of the DOD budget. [Ref. 9] 
To the program office developing or producing a MCCR system, the cost of 
software has become one of the system's most expensive elements. The software 
developmental costs for software intensive systems can result in large portions of the 
programs budget. Table I provides some examples of the software developmental cost 
and its percentage of the total developmental cost of selected DOD MCCR systems 
[Ref. 8]. 
TABLE 1. SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT COSTS 
SOFTWARE %TOTAL 
SERVICE PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT COST COST 
Air Force Adv Tactical $1 Billion 13% Fighter 
Air Force B-18 $726 Million 19% Bomber 
Army LHX Helicopter $11 5 Million 3% 
Navy SSN-21 Submarine $450 Million 13% 
Navy Trident II Missile $280 Million 9% 
With respect to volume, complexity, and cost, as well as functionality, 
software is a critical component in all MCCR systems. Without exception, performance 
of today's complex weapon systems is dependant upon the associated software. Software 
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has grown into a multi-billion dollar facet of the defense procurement process and it 
clearly plays a critical role in DOD's weapon systems. 
C. SOFI'W ARE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS IN DOD 
1. General 
As the role of software in DOD's mission critical systems has grown, so, too, 
has the significance of software development problems. Software developmental 
problems today have been referred to by some as a "software crisis. "[Ref. 9] 
Air Force General Bernard Rogers has characterized software as the Achilles' heel of 
weapon system development [Ref. 10]. By any account, software development has 
become one of the most significant sources of trouble to DOD weapon development 
programs. The Defense Systems Management College's Mission Critical Computer 
Resources Management Guide describes the impact of software development problems 
on military weapon systems in this way: 
Most systems are delivered late, have cost overruns, rarely meet performance 
requirements upon initial delivery and are often ridiculously expensive to maintain. 
It would be unfair to blame all of these unpleasant facts just on digital systems and 
software, but it is generally recognized that software is a major contributor, and 
often the only contributor, to these problems.[Ref. 6] 
2. Major Contributors 
There is a wide variety of software development problems that plague DOD 
programs. Figure 2 depicts the classic problems that contribute to the challenge facing 
program offices [Ref. 2:p. 9-1]. Problems from this list have surfaced over the past 
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several years in the development of numerous weapon systems causing problems with 
cost, schedule, and perfonnance. 
Figwe 2. Classic Software Development Problems 
A 1992 General Accounting Office (GAO) report on mission critical software 
challenges grouped the majority of these software development problems into three 
categories: (1) management, (2) requirements definition, and (3) testing. Management 
problems are those that program managers have direct control over, such as lack of 
management oversight, unsound development approaches, and poor management 
decisions. Requirements definition problems are those that involve the clear depiction 
of what a system is supposed to do. These problems include poorly defined 
requirements, requirements changes and a system's inability to adapt to changing 
requirements. Finally, testing problems are those that involve flawed approaches to 
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testing the system, such as omitting system level integration testing or testing conducted 
in inaccurate environments or using inaccurate models. [Ref. 12] 
While not all inclusive, these categories of problems contain the major contributors 
to significant cost increases, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that have 
troubled DOD programs. 
From another perspective, software development problems can be categorized as 
managerial problems or technical problems. This perspective looks more at the source 
or cause of the problems listed above. According to the Repon of the Defense Science 
Board Task Force on Military Software, the major problems with military software 
development are management problems, not technical problems. The Board considered 
these problems anchored in the attitudes, policies, and practices of DOD's software 
acquisition process. [Ref. 3:p. 7] 
3. Effects on the System 
The contributing software development problems discussed above have had 
a negative impact on the majority of MCCR programs during the development and 
production phase of their system's life-cycle. Under the Secretary of Defense's office, 
an official from the Office of the Deputy Director for Research and Engineering (Test 
and Evaluation) estimated that 7 out of 10 major weapon systems currently in 
development are encountering software problems, and the rate is 
increasing.[Ref. 11] 
While the actual effects of software problems vary among the MCCR 
programs, most result in significant impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. A 
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study conducted by the SEC estimates that the ave.rage MCCR program is likely to deliver 
one and one half years later than estimated at contract award. [Ref. 9] Past records of 
MCCR programs show that it is not uncommon for software development costs to exceed 
the original estimate by anywhere from 50-100 % . [Ref. 6] Though performance 
problems cannot be as easily summarized, numerous reports by the GAO over the past 
several years have clearly detailed the impact of performance shortfalls on a program's 
life-cycle and show that they contribute directly to cost and schedule problems. Whether 
the results impact cost, schedule, or performance, they always bring increased visibility 
to a program. This negative visibility often does the most damage or provides the 
biggest threat to a program. 
4. Why Does This Happen? 
Over the past two decades numerous reports and studies have analyzed 
software development in the DOD in an effort to identify the software related problems 
and address their causes. GAO reports have done much of the work in identifying the 
software problems that plague so many major weapon programs. In December, 1992, 
a GAO report titled Mission Critical Systems, Defense Attempting to Address Major 
Software Challenges provided an overview of these reports that summarized the common 
software development problems and reported what DOD was doing to address 
them.[Ref. 12] DOD has also conducted numerous studies that have attempted 
to address the causes of these problems. These studies have been much broader in scope, 
focusing on issues of problems associated with acquisition policy, the software acquisition 
14 
process, management oversight, and the supply of qualified personnel, to name a few. 
[Ref. 14] 
Yet, even with such detailed visibility and analysis on software problems and 
their causes, the majority of these problems still exist. Correcting them has proven to 
be difficult. This difficulty persists for several reasons. 
First, the software required to operate mission critical systems is, by nature, 
extremely complex. This complexity comes from the missions these systems perform 
and the environment they must operate in. For example, performing functions such as 
running large, graphical command and control networks, defending against airborne 
attack, or integrating multiple sensor data requires state-of-the-art technologies. These 
systems must operate in a real-time environment (in itself an extremely difficult task), 
over large geographical areas, and often be able to interoperate with other complex 
systems. Additionally, they must continue to function during enemy attempts to destroy 
or disrupt them. Producing a system of this complexity and reliability is no simple task. 
[Ref. 14:p. 5] 
Second, studies by the SEI indicate the majority of DOD agencies and defense 
contractors engaged in the acquisition, production, or maintenance of software are 
operating at an immature level of software development process maturity. Established 
by DOD to improve the practice of software engineering, the SEI developed a five-level 
process maturity model to assist and evaluate a contractor's software process. The SEI 
describes software process maturity in this way: 
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In a mature software process, people, methods, techniques, and technology are 
effectively and efficiently coupled to consistently produce quality software within 
the constraints on cost and schedule requirements. In an immature software 
process, costs and schedules are largely unpredictable, quality is generally 
marginal, and technology is often used ineffectively. [Ref. 13] 
Pictured below, Table 2 depicts SEI' s Software Process Maturity Model [Ref. 
15: Fig.1.2.1], and Figure 3 displays the distribution of software process maturity across 
the contractors and programs assessed by the SEI as of 1991 [Ref. 14]. Note 
that the vast majority of contractors (81 %) were assessed at the most immature level 
(level 1) and the highest level achieved at that time was level 3. 
TABLE 2. SEI SOFTWARE PROCESS MATURITY MODEL 
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Figure 3. Software Process Maturity Distribution 
Finally, the growing complexity and software dependence of current mission 
critical systems is outpacing the understanding of software as a product and its 
development process. As a result, weapon systems are continuing to be designed with 
more complicated software while developers are still wrestling with accurate methods of 
measuring critical software characteristics such as performance, security, and correctness, 
and the progress of developing software products. [Ref. 8] This situation is fueled by 
the DOD's runaway demand for new, leading edge weapon systems which grows far 
faster than the supply of skilled software professionals. [Ref. 10] 
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These factors combine to make the development of the unique and complex 
software required by weapon systems a high risk undertaking. The normal cost and 
schedule constraints of a DOD program weapon system software development, often 
unprecedented in design, presents an enormous challenge for software programmers and 
managers. The president of one software programming company supports this in his own 
words: 
Whenever I see one of these major new programs get behind schedule or go 
over budget, I know that the programmers just took the gamble and lost. It's 
embarrassing as a member of this industry to admit that these software projects are 
so risky that it's impossible to accurately predict a budget or schedule, but that's 
the case. [Ref. IO:p. 5] 
Most studies agree that there are no easy answers to these shortfalls in 
software development. While the DOD has been making efforts to address the issues, 
the current state of software development is still marked by high risk. A weapon system 
today that requires development of a complex software system must do so in a 
development process that is fraught with problems. 
D. CURRENT DOD PROCUREMENT ENVIRONMENT 
The risk of complex software development is not the only challenge facing program 
offices. Contemporary political and socioeconomic forces often make the very 
environment they operate in a precarious one. 
The end of the Cold War and strong domestic concern over the national deficit 
have prompted significant budget reductions for the DOD. Historically, Procurement and 
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT &E) accounts mirror the trend of the 
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total DOD budget, as they are the most discretionary. [Ref. 15] As shown in 
Figure 4, this has resulted in a consistent decrease in the annual Procurement and 
RDT&E (6.3 & 6.4) accounts since 1985. [Ref. 18, p. 8] 
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Figure 4. Annual Percent Change in Total DOD Budget Authority and the Sum of 
Procurement and RDT&E Accounts 
Now program offices must plan, develop, and produce sophisticated weapon 
systems under a much tighter monetary constraint. Affordability becomes a major issue 
facing all weapons programs. The affordability of a weapon system is directly affected 
by cost, schedule, and performance problems confronting these systems. If systems 
become unaffordable, politically or economically, they risk termination. 
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As the constraints on program offices have increased over the years, so has 
Congressional oversight of the procurement system. DOD procurement decisions commit 
the nation to billions of dollars in current and long-range expenditures. This has a large 
impact on the resources available to other national priorities. Because of the size and 
importance of these commitments and a history of weaknesses in the DOD acquisition 
system Congress closely scrutinizes the procurement process. The GAO, primarily 
responsible for this auditing action, has completed over 900 reports and testimonies since 
1971 covering every aspect of weapon system acquisition. [Ref. 18:p. 11] GAO reports 
that surface problems or inefficiencies in a weapon system procurement program bring 
high visibility to the program office and may cause loss of congressional support for a 
program. 
The procurement environment of decreasing funds and increasing scrutiny has 
different effects on each program office. Some programs may be partially shielded from 
this environment based on the priority of the mission need they satisfy. But, regardless 
of priority, all programs must still function within this environment where cost, schedule, 
and performance problems can threaten future funding decisions. 
E. CORRECTIVE SOFfW ARE MANAGEMENT 
In relation to the procurement of MCCR systems, corrective software management 
encompasses the decisions and management actions necessary to rectify problems 
encountered in the development of weapon system software. The primary goal of 
corrective software management is to satisfy system requirements while minimizing 
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impact on cost and schedule. When executed effectively, it entails a planned event 
focused specifically on the correction of software deficiencies with the necessary 
resources committed to accomplish and verify the action. 
Although one may assume this would be a common management response to a 
·problem, GAO reports from the past two decades describe numerous weapon system 
programs experiencing years of delayed fieldings and substantial cost overruns when 
software deficiencies were not effectively addressed. For example, in a March 1993 
GAO testimony before Congress the Director of the Defense and Security Information 
Systems reported on the status of the C-17 Aircraft's embedded software. The program 
encountered significant software problems early in development and was unable to deliver 
the proper software for the initial test flight. Rather than correcting these deficiencies 
before proceeding, the contractor was allowed to defer software development to follow-
on test flights and use developmental shortcuts in an effort to stay within the original 
schedule. This strategy continued to delay full testing of the software, forced changes 
in the acquisition plan, and precluded demonstration of the aircraft's ability to meet 
requirements. The software has remained behind schedule in the program, cost overruns 
have been significant, and performance shortfalls have hampered the system. 
[Ref. 16] 
Corrective software management, when used effectively, should focus on bringing 
the software of a system up to the developmental standard planned for when the major 
deficiencies were identified. During this effort a secondary goal should be to minimize 
deviation from the development schedule and adhere as closely to the original acquisition 
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plan as possible. This requires accepting and committing the additional funds and time 
necessary to accomplish the task of correcting the software problems at hand before any 
further work requiring that software is attempted. There little historical evidence that 
shows this approach has been used often in DOD procurements, but it has happened at 
least once. That one specific case of corrective software management is the focus of this 
thesis. 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided the background for the complex and challenging 
environment in which DOD programs procure software. Software plays a vital role in 
virtually all major defense weapon systems today. The annual cost and volume of 
software demanded by the DOD has grown exponentially in the last three decades, but 
this growth has been accompanied by growing software development problems. these 
problems have had a damaging effect on the cost, schedule, and performance of many 
weapon system programs and is now a major concern in the DOD. The DOD's ability 
to effectively manage the development of this software has been outpaced by the rapid 
growth in the size and complexity of the software in today's sophisticated weapons. In 
the current, unforgiving procurement environment a program office should be prepared 
for the common occurrence of software development problems by understanding how to 
effectively use corrective software management. 





The primary research strategy used in creating this work was the case study. This 
chapter addresses the case study methodology. A clear description of the case study as 
a strategy and a discussion of its advantages and drawbacks will be provided. The 
chapter will also discuss the application of the case study strategy to this thesis. 
B. CASE STUDY AS A RESEARCH STRATEGY 
When used as a research strategy, the case study can be technically defined as 
follows: 
A case study is an empirical inquiry that: 
• investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when 
• the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in 
which 
• multiple sources of evidence are used [Ref. 17:p. 23]. 
This definition highlights the characteristics that make the case study so useful in 
researching social science issues. It lends itself as an appropriate research strategy to be 
used in many settings in this area. They include: 
• policy, political science, and public administration research; 
• community psychology and sociology; 
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• organizational and management studies; 
• city and regional planning research, such as studies of plans, neighborhoods, or 
public agencies, and 
• the conduct of a large proportion of dissertations and theses in the social sciences 
[Ref. 17:p. 13]. 
Of course, there are other methods available to conduct this type of research. The 
case study is one of five common social science research strategies. The remaining four 
are experiments, surveys, histories, and the analysis of archival information (as in 
economic studies). Each of these strategies has a distinguishing set of characteristics that 
make it more suitable than the others for researching certain situations. The suitability 
of a strategy to a given situation depends on three conditions: (1) the type of research 
question being posed (who, what, where, how, or why), (2) the extent of control an 
investigator has over actual behavioral events. and (3) the degree of focus on 
contemporary as opposed to historical events. Table 3, below, displays how each of the 
five major strategies relates to relevant situations based on the three conditions. [Ref. 
17:p. 17] 
Table 3 shows that, while there is some overlap of applicable strategies for a given 
condition, each specific combination of the three conditions together is best suited to a 
specific research strategy. For example, experiments, histories, and case studies are all 
strategies that apply to "how" or "why" forms of research questions in the first condition. 
Yet, while an experiment focuses on contemporary events, it requires control over the 
behavior of those events. Histories do not require control over behavioral events, but 
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focus on events from the past. This leaves the case study with its own niche as the 
preferred strategy when "how" or "why" research questions are asked, when the 
investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary event 
within some real-life situation. [Ref. 17:p. 19] 
TABLE 3. APPLICATION OF DIFFERENT RESEARCH STRATEGIES 
Requires Control Focuses on 
Form of Research Over Behavioral Contemporary 
Strategy Question Event? Events? 
Experiment how, why yes yes 
Survey who, what, where, no yes 
how many, 
how much 
Archival Analysis who, what, where, no yes/no 
how many, 
how much 
History how, why no no 
Case Study how, why no yes 
Enumerating the advantages of the case study strategy shows its value to 
appropriate research requirements. As a research technique, " ... the case study 
contributes uniquely to our knowledge of individual, organizational, social, and political 
[events]" [Ref. 17:p. 14]. As mentioned earlier in this section, this implies a wide range 
of research situations to which the case study strategy is ideally suited. This specific 
need for case studies arises from the desire to understand complex social events. Using 
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the strategy enables an investigation to capture the holistic and meaningful characteristics 
of these events and analyze them as they occurred in their environment. [Ref. 17:p. 14] 
Another advantage of the case study is its access to a wide variety of evidence 
[Ref. 17:p. 20] Because the focus of case study research is on contemporary issues, the 
sources of data are normally plentiful. These sources include current and historical 
documents, data files, artifacts, observations, and interviews. Unlike histories or 
surveys, the ability to conduct personal interviews and make personal observations is a 
particular strength of the case study. This variety of data sources is important to 
conducting an accurate, unbiased case study. Rarely does one source of data contain all 
the pertinent evidence required to clearly understand a complex situation. In a case study 
the investigation can gain insight from several perspectives and better piece together the 
whole picture. 
Related to this is another advantage that stems from the opportunity to conduct 
personal interviews with people directly involved with the event being studied. The 
attitudes, personal expressions and comments of key players absorbed during interviews 
cannot normally be gleaned from reading documentation alone. The richness of this 
type of data provides a unique insight into the real meaning of events and relationships 
within their own settings. [Ref. 18:p. 8] 
The case study strategy does have potential drawbacks. Some of these drawbacks 
stem from the same characteristics that provide advantages. For instance, while personal 
interviews can add rich, qualitative data to the research, they can also add biased views 
that can influence the investigator. Similarly, lack of data sources may yield a one-sided 
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view of a situation that strongly influences the findings and conclusions. The 
investigator must follow a rigorous plan while conducting the research in order to ensure 
alternate views or opinions have been heard. 
Another drawback and common complaint about case studies is that they provide 
little basis for scientific generalization. This is primarily the case when only a single 
case study is performed. This complaint centers on the belief that single case studies 
cannot provide enough substantial evidence to validate the hypothesis of the research. 
This is a valid argument when case study results are statistically generalized to a 
population. There is little confidence in the statistical findings of any single case. 
Investigators can avoid this drawback by using the case study to generalize theoretical 
propositions. Case study findings can be used to generalize theory with reasonable 
confidence. [Ref. 17:p. 21] 
Often in research there is a preference for being able to control events which brings 
up the subject of replicability. Much of the data compiled in case studies are qualitative, 
gathered through interviews and observations. Analysis of qualitative data can lead 
different investigators to different conclusions. The conduct of a specific case study is 
difficult, or often impossible, to replicate. This situation adds a degree of uncertainty 
to the case study research process. [Ref. 18:p. 16] 
These drawbacks do not necessarily detract from the value of using the case study 
as a research strategy. Each research strategy has its own advantages and disadvantages 
depending upon the conditions they are used in. The investigator must take care in the 
design and conduct of a case study to avoid these drawbacks and follow standardized case 
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study techniques. If used properly, the case study strategy can yield reliable, valid 
results. 
C. APPLICATION OF THE CASE STUDY STRATEGY TO THIS THESIS 
This particular research topic was well suited for the case study strategy. The 
research question is a "how" question. The primary research question developed for this 
study is: "How can a Program Manager most effectively use corrective software 
management to solve problems that develop in the software acquisition process?" 
Because the issue involved the actions of an Army program office, the investigator had 
no control over behavioral events. Obviously, in referring to software management in 
an existing Army program office, the focus of the research is on contemporary events. 
Thus, the three conditions for case study suitability were clearly satisfied. 
The case that is the subject of this study involves a three year period in the life of 
an Army project office developing a battlefield command and control system. The case 
describes the policies, decision process, and actions in the correction of serious system 
software deficiencies discovered during the engineering and manufacturing development 
(EMD) phase. The events pertinent to the case research include the initial discovery of 
software deficiencies, the analysis of the problem, the planning of corrective action, the 
conduct of corrective action, and the verification of the corrections. The corrective 
action plan was successful and will be discussed in the next chapter. 
The contemporary issue involved is the effectiveness of program offices in 
managing the correction of software deficiencies that hinder the development of the 
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system. The significance of the problem has grown in the last two decades. It is an 
issue that affects many DOD program offices today. 
The project office in this case still exists and agreed to assist the research effort. 
Several sources of data were available and included written documentation, personal 
interviews, and taped interviews. The written documents included Government reports 
on the system, Government decision memorandums, and Government and contractor 
briefing charts. Interviews were conducted with Government project office personnel, 
Government contracted support personnel, and prime contractor personnel. These 
included the project managers from the Government and prime contractor, technical 
advisors and engineers from the Government (contracted support) and the prime 
contractor, and the Government Program Executive Officer having oversight of and 
decision authority over the project. The investigator was allowed access to both the 
Government project office and the prime contractor's program office. 
D. SUMl\fARY 
This chapter has discussed the use of the case study as a research strategy. It has 
highlighted some strengths and weaknesses of the strategy and described the suitability 
of the strategy's application in this thesis. The use of this methodology is advantageous 
here because of the significant results of this one project office in the area of corrective 
software management. The goal of the case study strategy in this work will be to 
illuminate the decisions that were made, why they were made, how they were 
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implemented, and what results occurred. In the next chapter the case will be described 
in detail. 
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IV. THE ENHANCED POSITION LOCATION REPORTING SYSTEM: 
A. GENERAL 
To win on today's battlefield you must first win the information war 
[Ref. 19]. This concept has fostered a need for a complex network of 
battlefield data distribution and communication systems in the Anny. Many of the 
software intensive systems required to meet this need are currently in development by 
Anny program offices. The Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) is 
one of these systems. This chapter will describe the EPLRS system and give a brief look 
at its developmental history. It will also describe the EPLRS Government and contractor 
program offices. The chapter will conclude with a review of the program schedule 
through completion of technical testing in 1989 and detail the significant problems 
encountered during this testing. 
B. THE EPLRS SYSTEM: 
EPLRS is a computer based communications system which provides secure, jam 
resistant, near real-time data communications to high priority data subscribers. 
Additionally, it provides identification, navigation, position location, and automatic 
reporting for tactical forces. Its primary mission is to provide this data communication 
capability in support of the data subscribers of the Anny Tactical Command and Control 
System (ATCCS). [Ref. 20:p. l] This requires EPLRS to interface with 
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and distribute and relay data for all of the automated battlefield systems that make up the 
ATCCS. ATICS includes systems such as Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data 
System (AFATDS), Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control and Intelligence 
(FAADC2I), All Source Analysis System (ASAS), and Maneuver Control System (MCS). 
Additionally, it must maintain its own network operation for its position, navigation, and 
identification role. This volume of system interfaces, near real-time function 
performance and network management requires EPLRS to have extremely complex 
software. Altogether, the system requires over 500,000 source lines of code (SLOC) to 
perform its mission [Ref. 21]. 
1. Description 
EPLRS consists of a network of ultra-high frequency (UHF) radio systems 
managed by a net control station (NCS). The radio system can be carried by individual 
soldiers, mounted on combat vehicles, or installed in aircraft. The NCS, housed in truck 
mounted shelters, provides network management functions for the entire EPLRS system. 
Figure 5 depicts the basic EPLRS elements [Ref. 22:p. I]. 
EPLRS is a spread spectrum system which utilizes Time Division Multiple 
Access (TDMA) technology. It is protected against electronic counter measures (ECM) 
through the use of frequency hopping and adaptive relay techniques, and security transmit 
power anti-jam characteristics. The system provides two levels of secure capability using 
cryptographic devices located within each radio set. The NCS is capable of storing and 
distributing cryptographic keys for each net in operation using over the air rekey 
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(OTAR). The EPLRS radio sets are designed to have a simplex data throughput rate of 
up to 1200 bits per second (bps). [Ref. 31:p. 2] 
EPLRS position location function is designed to locate an airborne user station 
within 25 meters of its actual location and a ground based user station within 15 meters 
of its actual location. The system is interoperable with the Marine Corps Position 
Location Reporting System (PLRS). EPLRS can support both Army Data Distribution 
System Interface and MIL-STD-1553B interface protocols. These two standard host 
system data interfaces allow EPLRS to interface with critical existing and emerging 
battlefield data systems. [Ref. 32:p. 2] 
2. Development History 
During the 1970's the Army and Marine Corps were developing PLRS as a 
joint program. Hughes Aircraft Company (hereafter referred to as Hughes) was the 
prime contractor for this system. PLRS was being designed to provide field commanders 
infonnation about the location of their forces and other friendly units in their area of 
operation. While PLRS was being developed, a need for a method of exchanging data 
among a variety of automated battlefield data systems evolved in the Army. In 1978, 
Hughes was awarded an Army contract to study the feasibility of integrating PLRS with 
the Joint Tactical Infonnation Distribution System (JTIDS) to satisfy this need [Ref. 
20:p. 9]. The Army chose to continue with this concept and initiated a program in July 
1979 known as the PLRS/JTIDS Hybrid, commonly called PJH. 
In the mid 1980s the Army restructured the PJH system architecture and 
separated JTIDS from the program. The system was renamed the Enhanced Position 
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Location Reporting System (EPLRS). EPLRS and JTIDS then became separate products 
under a project called the Army Data Distribution System (ADDS). The ADDS Project 
Manager (PM ADDS) currently manages the acquisition of PLRS, EPLRS, and the Army 
portion of JTIDS. [Ref. 22:p. l] 
The resulting system, EPLRS, now provided two primary functions. One was 
the basic PLRS function: providing position location, navigation, and identification 
inf onnation and reporting that infonnation to battlefield commanders upon request. The 
other function, representing the enhancement, provided automated network data 
communications support to weapon systems, sensors, and command, control, 
communication, and intelligence (C3I) elements. This function equates to providing a 
data pipeline for several battlefield host data and communication systems. [Ref. 31 :p. 
2] This system was developed as an acquisition category (ACAT) ID program. 
C. THE EPLRS PROGRAM OFFICES 
This section will detail the program office structure of both the Government and 
contractor sides of the EPLRS program. While these offices may have changed since the 
inception of the PJH program, this discussion will pertain to the program office structure 
since 1988. 
1. The EPLRS Government Program Office 
The EPLRS program office is located in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. 
Because EPLRS is a product of the ADDS program, PM EPLRS falls under the control 
of PM ADDS. PM ADDS is managed by the Program Executive Office, 
34 
Communications Systems (PEO COMM). Associated with the EPLRS and ADDS 
program offices is the office of the TRADOC Systems Manager, Army Data Distribution 
System (TSM ADDS) in Fort Gordon, Georgia. TSM ADDS is the liaison between the 
user community and the program office. 
The EPLRS program office has a core staff of three people: the Product 
Manager (Lieutenant Colonel/0-5), the Deputy Product Manager (GM-14), and a 
secretary. The remainder of the staff in the EPLRS office comes from the matrix 
support structure of the Communications and Electronics Command (CBC OM). While 
the total number of people on the EPLRS staff has varied, the average strength is 16 
personnel. The resident matrix personnel for EPLRS are a combination of Government 
employees and Government contracted employees. The mix of these employees varies 
with the availability of personnel in the matrix support organization. On average there 
has been a two person staff responsible for the program's software. Their responsibility 
is to oversee the development and production of all software associated with the system 
and ensure compliance with the applicable software plans and specifications. 
In addition to the main office in New Jersey, the EPLRS organization has a 
field office located at the prime contractor's facility in California. Known as the 
California Field Office (CFO), it also has a core staff of three personnel: the CFO Chief 
(Lieutenant Colonel/0-5), Deputy Chief (GS-13), and a secretary. The remainder of the 
CFO staff is a combination of government and contracted engineers and technicians. The 
total number of CFO personnel has varied during the program, but has roughly averaged 
15 personnel. The responsibility of the CFO is to provide on-sight management of the 
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program for the PM and monitor the work of the contractor. As an on-sight 
representative of the PM, the personnel in the field office can provide immediate 
feedback to the contractor and relay infonnation between the contractor and the PM. 
2. The EPLRS Prime Contractor Program Office 
The prime contractor for the EPLRS program is Hughes Aircraft Company. 
The actual system development work is perfonned by the Surface Systems Division of 
the Aerospace and Defense Sector of Hughes located in Fullerton, California. During 
the time of this case, the Hughes EPLRS and PLRS program management offices 
(PMO's) were under the control of the Tactical Data Distribution Systems PMO. The 
EPLRS PMO was supported by a matrix support system at Hughes similar to the 
Government matrix support system. Like its Government counterpart, the EPLRS PMO 
at Hughes relied on software technicians from the Hughes software engineering 
directorate (SEO) for the programs software work. 
D. EPLRS ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
The plan to procure EPLRS, initiated as Pili, was conducted under a five phase 
development strategy. This tailored strategy reflected the fact that the program was 
incorporating existing technology from other programs still under development. The five 
phase development strategy was as follows: 
1. A feasibility study of the concept of integrating PLRS and JTIDS, 
contracted to Hughes, was successfully completed in mid 1980. This work was identified 
as "System Definition" and· became Phase I of the development strategy. 
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2. In June 1980, Hughes was awarded a contract to demonstrate the technical 
feasibility of the system and validate the concept. This effort became Phase 2 and was 
identified as "Interoperability Verification". Hughes completed the contract in mid 1982. 
3. Phases 3 and 4 were consolidated and identified as "Operational 
Prototype". The contract for Phase 3/4 was awarded to Hughes in March 1982. The 
purpose of this phase was to develop an operational prototype, upgrade the system 
software, and develop the interface with other systems. Early in this phase (September 
1982) the Army System Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) approved acceleration of 
the five phase development strategy for PJH. Towards the end of Phase 3/4 the PJH 
architecture was restructured and JTIDS was separated from the program. The system 
was renamed the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS). Phase 3/4 was 
completed in February 1987. 
4. The Phase 5 contract was awarded to Hughes in April 1985. This contract 
required Hughes to produce sufficient quantities of equipment for developmental and 
operational testing. This would be accomplished by modifying PLRS radio sets and 
master stations to the required PJH, and later EPLRS, configuration. Phase 5 would 
culminate in the production of four EPLRS NCS's, 211 Enhanced PLRS User Units 
(EPUU's), and six electronic test sets for use in Prototype Qualification Test-Contractor 
(PQT-C) and Government technical testing. Thus equipment was to be delivered in a 
series of deliveries scheduled from November 1987-May 1988. [Ref.31] 
Based on early success in the accelerated program strategy, a Department of 
the Army In-Process Review held in January 1987 approved a Low Rate Initial 
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Production (LRIP) of an additional eight NCS-Es and 1843 EPUU' s. These systems 
would be used to support future testing and initial fielding requirements. Contingent on 
success in Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) full scale production was 
scheduled to begin in late 1989 [Ref. 20]. An early acquisition plan, shown in Figure 
5, depicts this strategy [Ref. 23]. 
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INITIAL PRODUCTION llPPI I GOVT TESTS ' 
I ITT/IOT&El I BASED ON CONWRSION OF I I ARMY PlRS ASSETS. DUllD 
I EQUIP FOR FIRST J DIVISIONS I FUll PRODUCTION I 
FUll SCALE PRODUCTION I I I 
I 
Figure 5 EPLRS Program Plan, Nov. 1987 
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E. TECHNICAL TEST II 
Hughes conducted formal test and demonstration of early prototype units in 1986. 
After making desired changes, formal prototype qualification testing (PQT-C) was 
conducted by Hughes on pre-production equipment in 1987. This PQT-C, as the term 
was used by Hughes, consisted of tests and demonstrations which confinned the integrity 
of the system design over the specified operational and environmental range. This series 
of tests included software verification, performance verification, functional certification, 
interface verification, environmental tests, electronic warfare tests, electromagnetic 
interface and compatibility tests, reliability qualification tests, and a maintainability 
demonstration. [Ref. 24] 
This was followed by the Government's version of prototype qualification testing 
(PQT-G), scheduled to begin in early 1988. PQT-G, a term also used by Hughes, refers 
to technical testing conducted at Government test facilities under operational conditions. 
These tests verify the performance specifications, objectives, producibility, adequacy of 
technical data package, and supportability. It also considers safety, health hazards, 
human factors, and manpower and personnel integration (MANPRINT) aspects. This 
Government testing is required to support IOT &E readiness and production decisions. 
For the EPLRS program this was referred to as Technical Test II (TT-II). TT-II was 
executed by the U.S. Anny Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) at the U.S. Anny 
Electronic Proving Ground (EPG), Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The testing resulted in two 
phases running from May 1988 to April 1989. The remainder of this section will explain 
the goals and results of TT-II. 
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1. Test Goals and Structure 
For the EPLRS program, IT-IT was an important, closing phase of 
developmental testing. The objectives for IT-IT were to determine whether EPLRS could 
meet its technical requirements in the intended operational environments and whether it 
was ready to proceed into operational testing. Additionally, TI-IT would serve as input 
in determining whether the system should be granted material release and proceed into 
full scale production at a later date. 
As originally planned, IT-IT would be conducted across a five month period. 
Another five months at the test site were allocated for follow-on design modifications, 
retests, and administrative actions. Due to the complexity of the EPLRS system and the 
numerous technical requirements to be assessed, the technical testing would be conducted 
across several, separately run scenarios. Each scenario would assess a different group 
of requirements. The detailed test plan would simulate varying communication traffic 
densities across a network of operational stations. This would include the EPLRS 
requirement to interface with several other "host" communication and data systems. The 
interface requirement posed one of the largest challenges of IT-IT for both the EPLRS 
Program Office and the testing community at the EPG. While a critical requirement for 
EPLRS is to successfully interface with other battlefield information systems (AFATDS, 
FAADC2I, ASAS, MCS, and others), most of these systems were still under 
development and not fielded prior to IT-IT. The test agency at the EPG, was responsible 
for producing the host simulators that could replicate the real systems during interface 
tests. Following successful completion of IT-IT, the EPLRS equipment would be 
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shipped directly to Fort Hood, Texas to begin operator training and, subsequently, 
IOT&E. 
2. TT-II Deficiencies 
TT-II identified numerous, significant deficiencies with the EPLRS system and 
1 test plan. The initial phase of TT-II was conducted from May '88 - September '88. At 
the beginning of the test it was recognized that the test instrumentation software needed 
to simulate the various battlefield information system interfaces was not fully developed. 
The decision was made to use the instrumentation in its current condition. This added 
' a larger than normal component of error to the test data. The resulting statistical 
1 
estimates of system parameters could not provide accurate estimates of system 
performance for test analysis. 
The EPLRS equipment itself revealed significant deficiencies in both 
capability and reliability. To summarize, the problems areas included failure of the 
, system to efficiently build a network of users, NCS and EPUU reliability, the ability to 
establish communications with stations controlled by other NCS' s (intercommunity 
needlines)1, and the ability to rebuild a network after disruptions. The majority of these 
problems were a result of software and firmware deficiencies. This is substantiated by 
the sole concluding statement of the test directorate's written results of TT-II, Phase I: 
1 For the EPLRS system a needline is "A requirement for two or more users to 
communicate. Needlines are defined by a source, destination, rate, [and] 
priority ... ". A community refers collectively to the EPUU's, or users, serviced 
by one NCS. 
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"It was concluded by the PM that the system should undergo firmware and software 
revisions, and a second phase of its Technical Test should be conducted in early 1989" 
[Ref. 25]. The EPLRS PM proceeded with plans to conduct TT-Il, Phase Il. 
In the four months that followed test instrumentation was improved and 
software and firmware revisions were made to the system. EPLRS proceeded into TT-Il, 
Phase Il at EPG in January 1989 and successfully demonstrated a number of 
requirements. Nonetheless, the test continued to surface major problems showing that 
significant deficiencies still existed in the system. Although the test instrumentation 
performed satisfactorily, critical problems continued to center around the developmental 
model of the NCS and the maturity of the system's software. The primary Government 
concerns resulting from phase Il of TT-Il were: intercommunity needline performance, 
system reliability, system and software maturity, human interface issues, and general 
system performance [Ref. 26]. 
Once again, the primary source of these system deficiencies was software and 
firmware problems. As a result, the EPLRS system did not successfully pass TT-Il. 
3. Impact of TT-II 
The results of TT-Il caused the program to breach several thresholds for 
performance criteria. This deviation from the EPLRS program baseline required a 
Deviation Report be submitted by the PM. Additionally, a Program Deviation Report 
Review Panel, headed by the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (Operations Research) 
(DUSA(OR)), was formed to review the EPLRS program. The increased visibility 
placed the program at risk of cancellation. In an effort to ensure survivability of the 
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program, the EPLRS PM was forced to restructure the program with a corrective action 
plan that would satisfy the review panel's concerns over whether the deficiencies could 
be fixed. The resulting plan to restructure the EPLRS program was accepted by 
the review panel. The panel recommended to the Anny Acquisition Executive that the 
new EPLRS program baseline be approved. [Ref. 27] The course of events 
brought major changes to the EPLRS acquisition plan. 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter has introduced the EPLRS program and the agencies responsible for 
it. It also provided a brief look at the history of the program and the acquisition 
strategy. The original EPLRS program strategy had a high level of concurrency. This 
level of concurrency and the decision to accelerate the developmental strategy increased 
the program risk. As a result of failing IT-II, the program was restructured to resolve 
critical deficiencies. 
The next chapter will review the restructured program in depth. The corrective 
action plan and its implementation by the Government and contractor program offices 
will be covered in detail. The role and impact of program oversight agencies and other 
external agencies will also be discussed. 
43 
V. EPLRS CORRECTIVE ACTION 
A. GENERAL 
As described in the last chapter, the results of TT-II Phase II presented a serious 
challenge to both the Government and contractor EPLRS program offices. They 
responded with indepth analysis and planning that produced an aggressive corrective 
action plan. This chapter will focus on the corrective action used by the Government and 
Hughes to correct system deficiencies identified in technical testing. 
First, the chapter will review the Government guidance in developing the plan. 
Next, it will provide a detailed review of the corrective action as it was executed. 
Lastly, the chapter will discuss the key actions taken by both the Government and 
Hughes Aircraft Company that were instrumental in the success of the corrective action. 
B. GOVERNMENT GUIDANCE 
Three important actions by various Government players served to shape the 
eventual corrective action plan for the EPLRS program. These were the program 
restructuring plan proposed by PM ADDS, the new test criteria developed by the TSM, 
and the report of the Program Deviation Report Review Panel. These actions set the 
boundaries and criteria for the corrective action plan. 
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1. Program Restructuring Plan 
EPLRS deficiencies in TT-TI revealed immature software, firmware, and 
hardware that could not adequately meet user requirements. This problem was primarily 
the result of an accelerated and concurrent program schedule. The intent of the 
restructuring plan was to adopt a more conservative approach, satisfy testing 
requirements, and return the program to a non-concurrent schedule. The restructuring 
plan was designed to accomplish the following [Ref. 28]: 
1. Fix and demonstrate technical test corrective actions. This entailed the actual 
execution of a corrective action plan. It required production representative models 
for testing, a process to verify correction of TI-TI faults, and Government 
participation and witnessing. 
2. Reduce technical risk through block upgrades. This would be accomplished 
through an evolutionary strategy. Low risk enhancements to the system would first 
be used to put a qualified system in the field. Higher risk enhancements would be 
added as block upgrades to put a better system in the field. 
3. Protect the Government's cost exposure. Initially, the Government would only 
guarantee payment for labor to correct system deficiencies. Hardware costs would 
only be paid for after successful completions of performance demonstrations. Clearly 
defined progress points would be established to monitor progress and base progress 
payments from. 
4. Test what {the Government] intends to buy. Conduct corrective action and future 
testing on production representative units rather than engineering development 
models. 
5. Consider user schedules. In restructuring, try to minimize the impact delayed 
fielding will have on units scheduled to receive EPLRS. 
2. TSM Development of New Test Criteria 
Based on EPLRS' performance in TT-TI, the TSM and the user community 
were losing confidence in the contractor. The TSM was concerned with Hughes' ability 
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to solve the serious technical problems in a reasonable time period. After an analysis of 
the test results and the work estimated to fix the system, the TSM provided PM ADDS 
with a set of future test thresholds which would raise the user's confidence in system 
technical performance. Specifically, these thresholds were test criteria identified for the 
major areas of system deficiencies which the TSM wanted to see met in upcoming tests. 
These criteria were set to account for incremental improvements beginning with 
corrective action testing and continuing through follow-on technical testing and JOT &E. 
[Ref. 26] 
3. Program Deviation Report Review Panel 
This panel, chaired by the DUSA (OR), was required by Title 10 of the U.S. 
Code to review the EPLRS program after it breached both cost and schedule areas of its 
program baseline. The panel reviewed several inputs: a technical evaluation of the 
EPLRS software system and the capability of Hughes's software/firmware development 
process, technical and program presentations from Hughes employees, the PM's proposed 
restructuring plan and new program baseline, and the Independent Operational 
Assessment of EPLRS conducted during TT-II. The panel's conclusions and 
recommendations, as forwarded to the Army Acquisition Executive, would form the 
guidance the EPLRS program must adhere to for its survival. The conclusions of the 
panel are summarized below [Ref. 27]: 
1. There are two flaws in EPLRS performance which, if not corrected, will be fatal: 
1) the failure of the system to establish intercommunity needlines, and 2) the 
demonstrated reliability of the NCS. 
46 
2. The software/firmware efforts of the contractor should be focused on 
demonstrating that successful operation in a multiple NCS configuration is possible 
at full EPUU load. 
3. The corrective action phase of the program's efforts should be clearly separated 
from the modernization phase currently in progress. The panel stated that the first 
step in ti getting well ti must . be directed towards achieving a successful system 
demonstration unencumbered by a simultaneous attempt at system modernization. 
4. The Project Manager's restructured program plan was adequate to ensure 
Government visibility into contractor progress and control Government financial 
exposure. 
5. A maturity matrix must be developed and included in the Test and Evaluation 
Master Plan (TEMP) and program baseline. This would be instrumental in approving 
future program events based on successful resolution of current problem areas in the 
system. 
6. Development of an adequate simulation program for development and testing 
purposes be undertaken as an urgent matter. 
These three actions clearly outlined the challenge facing the EPLRS program in 
correcting the problems identified in TI-II. They would provide the guidance for 
development and award of the contractual agreement used to execute corrective action 
for the program. 
C. PRODUCTION SYSTEM VERIFICATION 
The actual corrective action plan developed between the Government and Hughes 
was called Production System Verification (PSV). This section will provide a description 
of the concept, the basic plan and schedule, and how successful demonstrations in the 
plan triggered follow-on decisions. 
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1. Concept 
The concept for PSV was initiated by the PM ADDS and his Hughes 
counterpart, the TDDS PMO, with the original intent of showing that correction of IT-II 
deficiencies was feasible. The concept called for a discrete, dedicated plan focused 
exclusively on correcting test deficiencies. The plan would center on a disciplined Test-
Analyze-And-Fix (TAAF) methodology that emphasized risk management. The plan 
received top corporate involvement and high priority for resources from Hughes. The 
Army awarded PSV as a separate fixed price contractual effort at a price of $8.75 
millioi:i. The actual contract was a modification to the current LRIP contract for the 
EPLRS program. Hughes organized the effort as a separate program with its own 
program management office. The goals of PSV were to: 
1. Replicate and characterize the problems from technical testing. 
2. Understand their root causes and the fixes required. 
3. Develop and execute a quantitative plan to correct all deficiencies. 
4. Achieve the original intent of IT-II. 
2. The Plan 
The PSV plan was based on a Test-Analyze-And-Fix (TAAF) methodology. 
As shown in Figure 6, the TAAF methodology called for an iterative field testing cycle 
which would characterize system problems and verify system performance after 
corrections [Ref. 29]. EPLRS would be operated in a scenario similar to that 
used in IT-II. The data collection process of each test provided the data required to 
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conduct root cause analyses and develop corrective actions between field tests. There 
was an emphasis on strong configuration management in order to accurately track the 
numerous revisions to software and firmware associated with each test. 
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• IC NEEDLINES DEMO 
• FULLERTON PSV DEMO 
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FiQtS'e 6 Test Analyze and Fix Methodology for EPLRS 
The original plan included five field tests to be conducted in the area around 
· Hughes' Fullerton, California plant. These "back yard tests" were contractor controlled 
and involved the deployment of EPLRS equipment at stationary and mobile sites 
throughout the community. The deployment was designed to simulate the typical 
operational dispersion of two combat brigades and the associated EPLRS unit density 
. within that area. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) verified 
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the accuracy of this deployment scenario. The test environment was designed to simulate 
operational field conditions and the actual EPG test environment as closely as possible. 
While the PSV field tests were run by the contractor, the Government had 
several roles in the plan. The EPLRS PM and California Field office personnel 
monitored many PSV actions, including test preparation, testing, and analysis of results. 
EPG personnel were involved in test data collection and reduction. As mentioned above, 
TRADOC assisted with deployment verification and provided user participation for 
certain pans of PSV testing involving manpower and personnel integration (MANPRINT) 
deficiencies. Both Government and contractor personnel participated in IPRs conducted 
between deployments to assess status. 
The general strategy for the PSV field tests (Ffs) was first to replicate and 
characterize the problems found during technical test, incorporate the corrections to the 
system, and, finally, verify the proper system perfonnance through demonstrations. This 
strategy, used with a disciplined engineering process and software and firmware 
configuration management, was geared to achieve an incremental increase in system 
perfonnance. Figure 7, below, lists an overview of the objectives for each PSV field 
test. The objectives indicate the role of each field test in the strategy and show the 
software and firmware focus of the PSV plan [Ref. 29]. 
Based on the desire to minimize slippage of the EPLRS program, the PSV 
plan was assigned a compressed schedule. The PSV program actually began with Ff #1 
in June 1989, and would end with a fonnal system demonstration, scheduled for April 
1990. The field tests, averaging 2-3 days in duration, occurred approximately every six 
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Figure 7 PSV Field Test Objectives 
weeks. The schedule for the PSV program is shown in Figure 8 [Ref. 30]. 
This chart also shows the schedule for the conversion of four NCS's to be upgraded from 
the UYK-20 to the UYK-44 computer suite. This was a corrective step in fixing NCS 
problems. Also listed are the two critical demonstrations (demo) required in the PSV 
program. The intercommunity needline demo was required to verify the proper 
• 
performance of one NCS operating in concert with a second, as in a two brigade 
scenario. This was one of the two most critical deficiencies noted in TI-II. The second 
demonstration was the formal PSV system demo. This demo was based on formal 
Government technical test guidelines. Its plans required approval from the Government. 
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While the ultimate purpose of this demo was to verify system perfonnance, a major focus 
was the second of the two critical deficiencies from TI-II: NCS reliability. 
11189 1990 
PROGRAM ELEMENT J J A s 0 N 0 J F M A M 
I I I I I I 
TT PROBLEMS 
• 
FU REPLICATION OF TT PROBLEMS 
CHARACTERIZATION DATA COLLECTION & ANALYSl~f 
(EDM) FU I I I I 
SW/FW CORRECTIONS 
~ • DATA COLLECTION & ANALYSIS 
I 
EARLY PRODUCTION I AWARD SYSTEM VERIFICATION 
0 1 TESTS (PSV) 
cot. VERSI :>N OF PROO PLR 1 1 
• USI TO NCS UYK·44 CONFIG ~· 0 
f OPERAT c 
ERA 
PRODUCTION SYSTEM fTU PTS fT llCHL I EMO fTS 







FU FIOAMALI DEMO 
Figwe 8 Production System Verification (PSV) Plan 
3. Contractual and Logistical Considerations 
The first two field tests in the PSV strategy were actually funded under the 
dollars remaining in the current contract. This was negotiated and agreed to by the 
EPLRS PM, the Government contracting officer, and the contractor. Because of this 
available funding, Hughes was able to start corrective action soon after the end of TI-II. 
Committed to salvaging the program, Hughes offered to perform the rest of the PSV plan 
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on a pure cost reimbursement contract [Ref. 31]. The Government chose to use 
a fixed price type contract. Contract requirements in the statement of work reflected the 
inputs from the PM ADDS' restructuring plan, the TSM' s new test requirements, and 
the Program Deviation Report Review Panel's conclusions referred to in the last section. 
The logistical support for PSV was a large undertaking for Hughes. Field 
tests required manning of up to 84 stationary and mobile equipment sites. Hughes had 
to temporarily hire workers to man many of these sites. Other logistical support 
requirements fell into the areas of transportation, communication, maintenance, and 
training. Administrative functions, such as daily briefings and debriefings, worker 
problems, and personnel and equipment accountability were also required in the PSV 
plan. Logistical support alone was a major planning effort and consumed its share of the 
manpower and resources required to conduct PSV. 
4. Summary 
The focus of the PSV plan was limited to the specific problems identified in 
TT-Il. It was resource intensive and involved many of the Government agencies 
involved in the previous technical test. The compressed schedule and iterative software 
and firmware correction cycle would require quality configuration management. To 
achieve success, the PSV plan would have to conduct two successful demonstrations. 
Failure in either of these demonstrations could be "fatal" to the EPLRS program, at least 
for the current contractor. 
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D. KEY GOVERNMENT ACTIONS 
Software and firmware corrections accounted for the majority of the PSV plan. 
The difficult challenge to the Government was to manage the contractors execution of 
this software and firmware intensive corrective action while minimizing its own risk. 
The Government accomplished this with management actions that allowed them the 
visibility and control necessary for successful completion of the PSV plan. This section 
will detail these key Government actions. While the list is not all inclusive, it represents 
·the critical actions identified during the research. 
1. Software Engineering Assessment 
An early step for the Government was to determine whether Hughes had the 
capability to correct the flaws in the EPLRS system. To accomplish this, CECOM 
directed its Center for Software Engineering (CSE) to conduct an assessment of Hughes' 
software process capability and the development of software in EPLRS. A team from 
the CSE conducted the assessment using the SEI' s Software Capability Maturity Model. 
This was accomplished in July 1989. Hughes' software process was rated level II (above 
the 80th percentile of corporations) and the firmware process was rated level I-II (above 
the 50th percentile of corporations). The CSE team concluded that Hughes had the 
capability to isolate EPLRS system problems and successfully modify and test software 
and firmware to implement solutions. [Ref. 32] The Program Deviation Report 
Review Panel used this evaluation in determining its recommendation to the Acquisition 
Executive. 
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2. Contractual Considerations 
Two important aspects of the PSV contract protected the cost exposure of the 
Government and provided strong control measures. The first aspect was to require 
specific demonstrations to show progress of the PSV plan. These functional and system 
demonstrations acted as milestones or progress points by which progress co u 1 d be 
measured. The second aspect was a set of special provision clauses that contractually 
tied future program events and progress payments to the success of these demonstrations. 
Figure 9, below, shows how this worked. The dashed arrows connect the specific 
demonstration or test that must be completed to the event that will be initiated. 
Additionally, the contract was written to ensure payments for the PSV system 
demonstration, considered a program milestone, would not be made until successful 
completion of the demonstration was recorded in the Government test 
report. [Ref. 33] 
3. System Maturity Matrix 
As described above, several future program events for EPLRS were 
dependent on demonstrating the maturity of the system. At the direction of the Program 
Deviation Report Review Panel, the EPLRS PM developed a system maturity matrix. 
The purpose of the matrix was to was to track the maturity of specific software and 
hardware technical parameters. The matrix showed the relation of the critical technical 
parameters to specific demonstrations and tests and the program decisions they supported. 
This matrix was a part of the TEMP and the program baseline. An example page of an 
EPLRS maturity matrix is shown in Figure 10 [Ref. 20:p. 4]. 
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Figura 9 EPLRS Milestone Control Triggers 
4. The California Field Office (CFO) 
The CFO was the on-site representative of the EPLRS Government PM office 
located at the Hughes Fullerton plant. As described earlier, the CFO was a combination 
of Government and contractor employees responsible for the daily oversight of the 
program. During PSV the software and firmware related tasks of the CFO increased. 
Likewise, the staffing of the CFO increased from 15 personnel to 23 personnel. The 
number of contractors represented on the CFO increased from four to eight. The 
additions were all software and firmware technicians that assumed roles in monitoring 
field testing, system integration testing, and engineering of the EPLRS software and 
firmware. 
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Figure 10 Sample Page of EPLRS Maturity Matrix 
Testing greatly increased during PSV and so did the Government role in 
monitoring the software and firmware activities. The CFO staff conducted full time 
monitoring of the PSV field tests from set-up, to test, to post test analysis. The CFO 
also increased its role in monitoring regression and lab testing. 
S. Use of Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) 
During the PSV plan changes were made in the N&V structure for the 
program. First, an N&V team was stationed on-site at the contractor facility as part of 
the California Field office of the EPLRS PM. The on-site N&V team provided full time 
monitoring of the· software work and testing and quick feedback to the EPLRS PM at 
Fort Monmouth. At the start of PSV, N &V for EPLRS was conducted by two CECOM 
matrix organizations and the Marine Corps Tactical Software Support Agency 
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(MCTSSA). This complicated the IV&V effort. As a result, during the PSV plan, 
MCTSSA was given sole responsibility for EPLRS IV&V. MCTSSA was already 
performing software support for the Marine Corps' PLRS system. Their experience 
afforded the EPLRS PM detailed advice and comprehensive oversight of the contractor's 
software process. 
6. Information Reporting 
In addition to the monthly C/SCSC reports, the EPLRS PM had a full time 
information source through the CFO. The CFO was able to consult with the main PM 
office on important issues as they happened and relay status of the program whenever 
required by the PM. 
During PSV the Government program office began using more metrics to 
measure program progress. Particularly helpful in this area was the tracking of Hughes' 
rigorous Program Trouble Report (PTR) system. PTRs were tracked by the number 
expected, actually initiated, corrected, and still open. The increased use of metrics 
afforded the PM greater visibility of the program status. 
The Government and Hughes also began conducting "Tech Interchanges" 
every two months. These allowed discussion and work on program technical issues 
between the off-site Government representatives and the contractor representatives. This 
allowed for Government-contractor interaction on a more frequent basis than the standard 
IPR every six months. 
Additionally, the EPLRS PM and his Hughes counterpart had an agreement 
to share information from the Hughes PMO meetings. The Hughes PMO agreed to 
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fonnat the briefing slides from their regular, weekly EPLRS meetings in a C/SCSC style 
fonnat. Copies of the slides and other infonnation from these meetings were sent to the 
EPLRS Government PM on a weekly basis. Hughes was very open about sharing 
, infonnation with the Government PM and kept the Government well infonned. 
7. User Involvement 
TRADOC provided customer representatives at the contractor site to increase 
user involvement in the revision of the EPLRS system. Several of the deficiencies to be 
corrected were MANPRINT issues, such as lack of user friendly software in the NCS 
software programs. These U.S. Anny personnel from the user community were trained 
on the EPLRS equipment and participated in the field tests at the Fullerton plant. They 
were debriefed after each test for comments on problems they experienced using the 
system and to gain their perspective on what they liked and disliked about EPLRS. 
8. Testing 
The scope of testing for PSV was greatly increased from that of previous 
work on the EPLRS contract. The statement of work for PSV called for three 2-3 day 
test cycles for the Test-Analyze-And-Fix portion of the plan. These were to occur 
approximately every six weeks. It also required a system level regression and 
. verification lab test, an Intercommunity Needline field demonstration, and a PSV system 
field demonstration be conducted. All TAAF field tests and the two field demonstrations 
· were to be patterned after the two brigade deployment scenarios used during TT-II. 
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E. KEY CONTRACTOR ACTIONS 
PSV also posed a difficult challenge to the Hughes Aircraft Company• but a 
different challenge than that faced by the Government. The Government had to take 
actions that allowed it to effectively manage the contractor in his work. Hughes had to 
take management actions that facilitated the efficient and effective corrections of a 
software and firmware intensive system. This section will describe some of the key 
actions taken by Hughes to manage its work during PSV. 
1. Contractor Openness and Cooperation 
Throughout execution of the PSV contract Hughes maintained an open and 
cooperative attitude in its work with the Government. The Hughes PMO worked closely 
with the Government PM to develop the PSV concept and implement the plan. There 
was very open communication between the Government and Hughes PM's and they had 
a good working relationship. The Hughes PMO invited Government representatives to 
attend the weekly program reviews and the daily coordination meetings, and mailed the 
briefing charts of each meeting to the Government PM in Fort Monmouth. This 
cooperative attitude was apparent throughout Hughes' EPLRS program structure. 
2. Exhaustive Test Strategy 
Testing was listed earlier as a key Government action, but it was also a key 
Hughes action. Hughes developed the PSV plan with the Government and saw the need 
for extensive testing in order to mature the software and finnware in the EPLRS 
program. The testing was comprehensive and designed to produce the large volumes of 
60 
data that, after being reduced, could be analyzed and used to fix problems. Figure 11 
shows the progress made in solving EPLRS software and firmware problems with each 
iteration of testing. 
The testing also required tremendous logistical support from Hughes. For 
example, Hughes had to hire temporary help to man all the test sites during much of the 
field testing. Hughes made the effort to hire primarily people who had previously 
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Figure 11 PSV Software/Firmware Problem Closure Summary 
3. Team Concept 
The Hughes Ground Systems Group is organized into functional divisions, 
such as its Software Engineering Division (SED). Support for the Hughes program 
offices comes from these divisions in a matrix type system. Yet, the support for the PSV 
program was organized under a team concept where the functional support personnel 
from the various divisions collocated with the PSV program management office. The 
PSV team included specialists from all functional areas critical to the program. The team 
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concept provided the Hughes PM with increased access to the functional support required 
and created a more focused support relationship. 
4. Corporate Involvement 
The coiporate leadership at Hughes was actively involved in the PSV 
program. Coiporate leadership lent personal support to the plan and participated 
personally in various briefings to the D.A. staff. The PSV program office was given 
high priority for resources by Hughes coiporate staff, to include selection of personnel 
for the program office and priority on use of the test bed assets for PSV requirements. 
The high level staffs also monitored the status of PSV closely. The Hughes PM for PSV 
attended weekly reviews with the division manager, monthly reviews with the group 
management staff, and periodic reviews with the Hughes coiporate staff. PSV was a 
high visibility program at Hughes Aircraft Company. 
S. Risk Management and Reduction 
The test intensive nature of the PSV plan was a function of the risk 
management focus at Hughes. Risk management and reduction efforts were not properly 
emphasized in earlier phases of the EPLRS program, as evidenced by the results of TI-
Il. In the PSV plan, risk management and risk reduction were emphasized by both 
Hughes and the Government, and actually characterized the program. Planned events 
in PSV, such as its iterative testing cycle, frequent reviews, planned incremental 
improvements, and contractual milestone requirements, showed a strong emphasis on risk 
management and reduction from the perspectives of both Hughes and the Government. 
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F. RESULTS OF PSV 
The PSV program was formally completed in May 1990. Its success had several 
measures. On 22 May 1990, the PEO COMM and the EPLRS PM briefed the DUSA 
(OR) on the successful results of the PSV system demonstration. The results of the 
demonstration were confirmed by both the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity 
(AMSAA) and the Operational Test and Evaluation Agency (OTEA). Accordingly, the 
Secretary of the Army certified that the system met PSV exit criteria. [Ref. 34] 
The EPLRS system met or exceeded the exit criteria in every problem area during 
the required demonstrations. Consequently, option 1 of the LRIP contract was awarded 
to Hughes, as stated in the PSV contract. Additionally, an earlier requirement for a TI-
ii, Phase 3 was deleted from the EPLRS program test strategy by the DUSA (OR). An 
amended test schedule was approved for the EPLRS program that facilitated completion 
of system enhancements and progress towards IOT &E and a full scale production 
decision. 
Hughes achieved other positive results from PSV. Several of the successful aspects 
of the PSV program have been carried over to follow-on program work. These actions 
include a more aggressive test approach, earlier and frequent integration of Government 
instrumentation and test equipment, and use of the team concept [Ref. 22:p. 2]. 
Since PSV the EPLRS system has successfully passed a third technical test (TI-III) 
and, at the time of this research, is preparing for IOT&E in April-May 1994. 
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G. SUMl\:IARY 
This chapter has attempted to accurately cover the events that guided the planning 
of the EPLRS PSV program and the execution of the PSV plan itself. The seriousness 
of the problems encountered by the EPLRS program in TI-II brought high visibility to 
the program. The resulting involvement by the D.A. staff and other agencies external 
to PEO COl\fM produced high level guidance that helped define the PSV plan. The 
actual plan was a discreet, comprehensive correctional plan committed to fixing the 
problems that had surfaced in the EPLRS system. Prudent actions taken by both the 
Government and the contractor properly addressed risk management and ensured success 
of the PSV phase of the EPLRS program. The PSV program did achieve success in 
meeting or exceeding all exit criteria and the EPLRS program was able to continue 
towards its goal of full scale production. 
The next chapter will provide an analysis of the events described in this chapter. 
After analyzing the PSV program events, lessons learned will be extracted from the 
work. 
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VI. ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED 
A. INTRODUCTION 
By the measurements of success described in the last chapter, the PSV program was 
successful in correcting the EPLRS software and firmware shortfalls that surfaced during 
TI-II. This chapter will analyze the events occurring and decisions made during the 
PSV program in the context of corrective software management. The goal of the analysis 
is to link specific management actions of the Government and the contractor to the 
successful completion of the PSV program. Following the analysis will be a discussion 
of the applicability of this case to other DOD programs. This will be followed by a list 
of lessons learned generalized from the EPLRS case for application to other software 
intensive DOD programs. 
B. ANALYSIS 
This analysis will be structured around the key issues of the PSV program 
identified during the research. The events analyzed will include some that preceded the 
PSV program, but were instrumental in its design. 
1. Involvement by Higher Level Authorities 
The level of oversight involvement in EPLRS software corrective action was 
a function of the severity of the problem the program was facing. EPLRS' performance 
during TI-II resulted in both cost and schedule breaches of the program baseline. This 
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brought a high level of visibility to the program and a mandatory investigation by a 
Program Deviation Report Review Panel. As head of this panel, the Deputy Under 
Secretary of the Army (Operations Research) (DUSA (OR)) became significantly 
involved in program oversight as the Army Acquisition Executive's representative. 
Concern by the DUSA (OR) and the TSM over the magnitude of the software corrective 
action required placed the program at great risk. Their support for the EPLRS program 
was critical for its survival. The serious software problems encountered by such a 
complex software system tested that support. 
As EPLRS was a product of a larger project, PM EPLRS had two other 
higher level authorities: PM ADDS and PEO COMM. Both of these positions were 
involved in the daily actions of the EPLRS program and had a clear understanding of the 
situation. The resulting guidance from all of these positions formed clear boundaries 
within which the EPLRS program had to work to correct its problems. 
This involvement added constraints and increased external pressure on the 
Government and contractor PMs in their effort to correct system problems. The added 
pressure and increased constraints were indicators of the loss of confidence by the higher 
level authorities in the program. Failing the expectations of the DUSA (OR) or the TSM 
in correcting the system deficiencies may likely have been fatal to the EPLRS program, 
resulting in its termination. 
The resulting plan and thresholds for correcting the software and firmware 
in the PSV program closely followed the input from these higher level authorities. 
Adherence to this guidance and success in the program helped the Government and 
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contractor program offices regain the confidence and maintain support of higher level 
authorities. The PEO COMM, PM ADDS, and PM EPLRS understood the importance 
of such support. They took steps to ensure the user community and DOD, as well as the 
right Congressional staff, understood the PSV program. Key players were given briefed 
in order to build support for the program. [Ref. 35] 
Maintaining this confidence and support was critical to conducting the 
corrective action plan. Without the confidence and support of the TSM and the decision 
making authorities in the program's chain of responsibility the EPLRS system would 
have had little chance of survival. 
2. Risk Management 
Several actions that were either precursors of PSV or actual steps in the plan 
were indicative of good risk management. 
The plan to restructure the program showed an appreciation for the high level 
of risk involved in developing unprecedented software by the original program strategy. 
The five goals of the restructuring plan (see Chapter V, section B. l.) were each 
explicitly focused on reducing a source of risk related to the system's software problems. 
While this restructuring plan affected the entire EPLRS acquisition strategy, it had a 
marked influence on the formulation of the PSV plan itself. The restructuring plan 
removed the concurrency in the EPLRS acquisition strategy in an effort to shift to a more 
conservative developmental approach. This approach led to the PM ADDS' proposal to 
ensure a clear separation between the PSV phase of the EPLRS effort and a concurrent 
proposal to modernize the NCS. The Program Deviation Report Review Panel 
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supported this position with this statement: " ... the panel holds the view that the first step 
in 'getting well' must be directed to achieving a successful system performance 
demonstration unencumbered by a simultaneous attempt at NCS modernization" [Ref. 
27]. The plan to fix the software and finnware problems of EPLRS was in itself a 
complex task. This effort to simplify and focus the software corrective action by 
isolating it from other program tasks reduced the risks of configuration problems, 
competing resources, and integration difficulties, to name a few. 
The restructuring plan moved the program towards more of an evolutionary 
acquisition strategy. An evolutionary acquisition strategy is one that produces a basic 
model to meet initial operating capability (IOC) and incrementally builds improvements 
to that model [Ref. 36]. Just as with the system as a whole, an initial software 
functionality would be developed and delivered. This strategy would implement the 
essential software corrections to field. a lower risk, IOC model. Developmental risk is 
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reduced because such factors as the size of the software development team and the 
possible communications links are reduced in comparison to a grand design project. 
Because the size and degree of functionality of the IOC software is reduced, development 
complexity is lower. New software builds and planned system improvements of higher 
risk would be included in block upgrades for EPLRS after its initial fielding [Ref. 28]. 
This incremental strategy also allows better focus on a smaller scope of work. This 
reduces risk in design and testing of the program. 
The restructuring plan also addressed risk management techniques involving 
testing and contractually protecting Government cost exposure. These actions will be 
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addressed individually later in this section. Including these actions, the influence of the 
restructuring plan was clearly evident in the resulting PSV plan. It strongly emphasized 
reduction of risk involved with the software process for the corrective action necessary 
in PSV and in follow-on program phases. 
Another risk management action taken by the Government was to conduct an 
independent technical assessment of the software capability of the contractor. The 
purpose was to assure the Government that the software capabilities existed at Hughes 
to resolve the problems from TT-II. The results of the assessment were that Hughes had 
a level 2 software capability and a level 1.5 firmware capability as measured by the SEI 
capability maturity model. There were two positive results. First, the assessment 
convinced the Government that Hughes had a more than adequate software development 
capability to perform the needed work in PSV. This acted to reduce the risk in the 
decision to stay with Hughes as the prime contractor. It also increased the Government's 
confidence in the ability of Hughes to perform quality software work. Secondly, while 
the assessment described a disciplined and repeatable software engineering process at 
Hughes' SED, it pointed out some weaknesses in their firmware engineering process. 
Hughes used these results and recommendations to improve their firmware development 
process. Because EPLRS is finnware intensive, this proved beneficial to both EPLRS 
and the PSV program. 
The Government also managed risk through contractual actions. The use of 
special provision clauses in the PSV contract reduced liability of the Government during 
the execution of the contract. These special provision clauses had two important effects. 
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First, the clauses stated that specific future program events, such as first article test 
(FAT) and options 1 and 2 to the current LRIP contract, were to be exercised only upon 
successful completion of a required demonstration or test. F.ach of these future events 
was contractually tied to one of these demonstrations or tests. Secondly, special 
provision clauses ~eld the contractor monetarily liable for system shortfalls during the 
two field demonstrations and technical test II phase 3. Failure at any of these tests would 
require the contractor to conduct analysis and make corrections as required to pass the 
event to Government satisfaction, at no change to the fixed price contract. These same 
clauses also allowed the Government contracting officer to stop progress payments for 
any of these test failures. The special provisions section of the PSV contract 
modification is included in appendix 1. [Ref. 33] 
These contract clauses served to reduce the risk of the Government by 
reducing future program liabilities until Hughes passed specific milestones. The clauses 
increased the monetary risk to Hughes, motivating Hughes corporate to place a high 
priority on the PSV program. Because Hughes had lost some of the Government's 
confidence after failing IT-II the situation warranted a greater shift in contract risk from 
the Government to the contractor. 
The last action to be discussed in this section is the PSV maturity matrix. 
One conclusion of the Program Deviation Report Review Panel was that the EPLRS PM 
must develop a maturity matrix and include it in the EPLRS TEMP and program 
baseline. This matrix would assist the Government and the contractor in tracking the 
contractual requirements described above. It clearly listed the required software technical 
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parameters to be met and. related them to the demonstrations or tests they occurred in and 
the program decision they supported. This matrix provided a tool for accurately tracking 
the maturity of the system. It used that maturity as a measurement of risk. 
These actions on the part of the Government highlighted the effort to manage 
risk in the PSV plan. Shifting to a more conservative strategy and isolating the 
corrective action plan from other work helped to better address the risk inherent in 
correcting software problems. The independent software process assessment and use of 
special contract provisions were actions that further reduced the Government's risk. 
Based on the high level of risk involved in the EPLRS software corrective action plan 
these were prudent actions. 
3. Testing 
One factor contributing to the TT-II failure was an underestimation of system 
testing required for the engineering development model (EDM) of EPLRS [Ref. 22:p. 
4]. The test-analyze-and-fix (TAAF) methodology adopted for PSV provided a 
comprehensive, iterative test strategy that incrementally identified problems and corrected 
them for the system. This type of test methodology was well suited to address the 
number of problems present in the complex software and firmware of the EPLRS system. 
The resulting test plan for PSV had two important characteristics that differed from 
previous contractor testing for EPLRS. It focused on field testing (vs. lab testing) and 
used a far more realistic test environment. Hughes had learned that failing to stress the 
software and equipment under more realistic field conditions, rather than simulation 
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programs, masked many of the software faults in the system. This was partly responsible 
for some of the software immaturity in IT-Il. 
Additionally, Hughes adopted the practice of conducting detailed dry runs 
before each demonstration or test. These "dress rehearsals" represented the actual event 
and were witnessed by Government program personnel. Conducting dry runs better 
prepared Hughes for each event and reduced the risk involved. 
Design of the test strategy was strongly influenced by lessons learned from 
previous testing. Based on the complexity of the software and the risk of the program, 
the iterative TAAF methodology was an effective choice for the PSV program. 
The Government required two demonstrations be integrated into the test plan 
to serve as milestones or progress points. These two events required the demonstration 
of performance parameters that were listed as critical shortfalls in TT-Il. The second 
demonstration was also used to demonstrate total system performance. The Government 
and Hughes were able to use these demonstrations to show the progress of the PSV 
program and to verify the fixes of noted shortfalls from TT-Il. The demonstrations 
served as easily quantifiable benchmarks to track the readiness of the program to enter 
the next phase of Government testing. 
PSV also had a significant increase in the amount of participation by 
Government workers. Testing, a major portion of the PSV plan, benefitted from this. 
Government personnel from the CFO advised the contractor with preparation of test 
documentation prior to formal submittal. This assisted the contractor in producing test 
documentation that would be more acceptable by the Government. After submitting the 
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documents, face to face meetings with Anny technical representatives helped identify any 
misunderstandings in the test concept or plan. It also identified any problems prior to 
the actual testing. This cooperation before the actual testing benefitted Hughes. By 
closely scrutinizing the test plans with the Government, Hughes would have nothing to 
hide at test time. Test problems would then not be viewed with suspicion by the 
Government. The Government also had a more accurate base of know ledge to assess the 
test progress from and could better assist Hughes in problem solving when necessary. 
Anny customer representatives worked in-plant with Hughes engineers to 
improve requirements interpretations. This allowed Hughes to verify their interpretation 
of the software and system requirements before testing. These users also participated in 
field testing. Assessments of equipment operations from the users helped to solve the 
MANPRINT problems of the system. This user input added expertise that was not 
widely used, nor available, prior to PSV and helped make the software more user 
friendly. 
Personnel from the Anny test community also assisted Hughes on-site in 
conduct of the PSV testing. EPG personnel and their contractor responsible for the test 
instrumentation worked with Hughes engineers to ensure their test equipment interfaced 
with the EPLRS system. They also assisted with the software that ran the test scenarios 
and the data reduction requirements after test. The EPG personnel also assisted Hughes 
in making test planning representative of the testing requirements at EPG. This expertise 
increased the effectiveness of the Hughes PSV program as a preparation for the next 
phase of Government testing. 
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Lastly, Hughes made significant improvements in their test simulation and 
analysis support tools for the PSV program. This equipment helped to improve 
monitoring and data collection during testing. The simulation tools provided a much 
more realistic test scenario in which to adequately test and stress the software in the 
EPLRS system. The lack of such test equipment in earlier testing masked a number of 
problems and decreased the efficiency of the test efforts. The improved equipment even 
allowed for better test planning. Since scenarios were more accurate, the time required 
for adequate data collection was better known. 
Overall, the test strategy, plan, and assets were greatly improved over 
previous tests' efforts. The improved test capability helped to ensure a more effective 
effort in testing the software and verifying its proper correction. Hughes' efforts to 
conduct exhaustive field tests in a realistic environment advanced the maturity of the 
software and firmware. 
4. Organizational Structure 
Both the Government and the contractor made adjustments in their 
organizational structure for the conduct of PSV. These changes were centered around 
moving software expertise closer to the center of program events. 
The Government PM for EPLRS already had an established California Field 
Office at Hughes' Fullerton plant. At the initiation of PSV the PM increased the 
number of software technicians in the CFO. Their role was to closely monitor and assist 
all software and firmware functions by the contractor throughout the PSV program. 
Their presence provided both the Government and the contractor with a valuable source 
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of advice on software and firmware. The contractor could gain advice on Government 
requirements and standards for the software work being performed. The Government 
PM could receive daily feedback on software corrections and new issues. With software 
technicians acting as the PM's "eyes and ears" at the contractor's plant, the PM was 
always knowledgeable about the software status of the program. Awareness of this status 
was critical for the PM. 
An important group in the CFO was the IV&V team. Originally the IV&V 
role was filled by three different agencies: two CECOM matrix support organizations and 
MCTSSA. During the PSV program MCTSSA was selected to be the single IV & V agent 
for EPLRS. This provided a number of benefits for the program. First, going to a 
single IV&V agent provided better control of the IV&V function. IV&V work was not 
duplicated and the single agency reduced confusion. Secondly, MCTSSA had the most 
experience in the system. MCTSSA was the Marine Corps' software IV&V agent,as 
well as post deployment software support agent, for the PLRS program. As such it 
already had a great deal of experience with the CMS2 program language, the language 
used in EPLRS at the time. Also, over 50 percent of the software code between PLRS 
and EPLRS was common to both systems [Ref. 36]. This made the choice to 
select MCTSSA as the single IV &V agent a logical move beneficial to both the 
Government and contractor PM. Another important consideration in the decision was 
that MCTSSA was well suited to assume the PDSS role in the future. As previously 
stated, they performed this function for the PLRS program and already had the assets 
required to conduct the work. The decisions to work with MCTSSA in these roles 
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married the EPLRS program with the Government agent perhaps having the most 
experience in this system. It proved to be a valuable source of expertise to the program. 
Hughes also made adjustments to its organizational structure by using the 
team concept to staff the PSV program office. The "Tiger Team" concept placed Hughes 
support personnel under the complete control of the PSV PM for Hughes [Ref. 29]. This 
reduced the administrative restrictions of the nonnal matrix type functional support for 
program managers at Hughes. The PSV PM now had consistent manning in the technical 
support positions of the office and better control and influence over the staff. This gave 
the PM dedicated software and firmware technicians that reported directly to the PM 
rather than the SED. 
Changes in organizational structure were made by both the Government and 
the contractor in the PSV program. These changes allowed program offices to put 
software and firmware technicians at the critical spot where they could best impact the 
software and firmware corrective action. Both the on-site Government representatives 
and Hughes' "Tiger Team" fonnation provided software expertise to focus on the 
software issues. It place more control in the hands of the program managers. 
S. Information Flow 
Communications between the Government EPLRS PM and the Hughes PM 
was frequent, open, and most often conducted through infonnal channels. While more 
formal channels of communication were already in place, such as the C/SCSC reporting 
system or IPRs every six months, the informal channels often provided a more valuable 
and timely source of information for accurate program information and decision making. 
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One of the key sources of infonnation for the Government PM was the CFO. 
The on-site presence of the CFO offered the PM immediate Government status on 
software test results and other software issues during the corrective action process. The 
CFO also helped in the relay of infonnation between the PMs. This immediate source 
of infonnation facilitated decision making for both the Government and contractor PMs. 
Another source of Government infonnation was directly from the contractor. 
During this corrective action effort the desire for open lines of communication was 
mutual for both PM offices. The Hughes PM agreed to provide as much program 
infonnation as possible to the Government PM. For instance, Hughes' briefing charts 
and minutes from the weekly contractor program status meetings were immediately 
mailed to the Government PM. Hughes' program personnel made frequent use of 
Electronic mail and facsimile communications with the Government PM office. These 
channels were used to keep the Government office continually updated on the status of 
the software corrective action. [Ref. 36] 
"Tech interchanges" were another non-standard channel of information. 
These face to face meetings allowed more frequent exchanges between the Government 
and contractor counterparts than did the semi-annual IPRs. This improved the technical 
coordination for the program. 
The extensive use of these informal channels of information by both the 
Government and the contractor facilitated the corrective action plan. Accurate and timely 
knowledge of program status assisted the Government PM in decision making and 
communication with oversight agencies. The shared knowledge between the Government 
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and contractor PMs made their communications more effective. Faster insight into 
program problems allowed solutions to be developed more quickly. The nature of the 
corrective action plan required a frequent source of open communication between the 
program offices. 
6. G<>vernment-Contractor Relations 
The PSV program was characterized by a good working relationship between 
the Government and Hughes. Hughes maintained an open and cooperative attitude 
throughout the length of the program. Hughes was involved up to the corporate level in 
the design of the PSV plan. Their managers participated in briefings to various 
Government agencies during the planning process of PSV. These actions showed the 
Government a sense of dedication and commitment from Hughes to succeed in correcting 
EPLRS problems. 
In particular, a high level of cooperation existed between the Government 
EPLRS PM and the Hughes PSV PM. As mentioned above, Hughes openly shared 
program information with the Government. They invited CFO personnel to attend all of 
their program office meetings. Briefing charts from the Hughes meetings were prepared 
in a format that would be most helpful to the Government PM office. These actions 
were above those called for in the contract. This open and cooperative attitude built a 
sense of trust between the counterpart PM offices and created a productive environment. 
Another significant indicator of Hughes' cooperation was the level of 
involvement by Hughes' corporate leaders. In both the planning and execution of the 
PSV program Hughes' corporate leaders were actively involved. They helped brief 
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Government decision makers, provided input to the planning process, and pledged full 
support of the corrective action plan in tenns of Hughes resources. The corporate staff 
gave the PSV program full priority for personnel and industrial assets at the expense of 
other Hughes' programs. This corporate involvement by Hughes served to both facilitate 
the work of the PSV program office as well as satisfy Government officials of the 
commitment of the corporation to the correction of the EPLRS system. 
The good relation between the Government and Hughes was a significant 
factor in the success of the PSV program. Adverse Government-contractor relations, not 
uncommon in stressful program situations where corrective action is required, often 
hinder the effectiveness of program offices in managing work. Lack of support at the 
corporate level can constrain the efforts of a program, impeding chances of program 
success. Fortunately for the EPLRS program this was not the case. 
C. GENERALIZING THE EPLRS CASE TO OTHER PROGRAMS 
Obviously, every program situation is unique. Among software intensive programs 
the potential problems that may be encountered are numerous, each presenting a different 
challenge. But, there are some common threads in the requirements of software intensive 
programs with problems that warrant corrective action. This section will first address 
the unique characteristics of the EPLRS corrective action case. It will then discuss those 
characteristics of the EPLRS case that may be viewed as common and useful to other 
software intensive DOD system programs. 
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1. Unique Characteristics of the EPLRS Case 
In this discussion the tenn "unique" refers to those characteristics of the 
EPLRS case that may not be easily generalized to other DOD systems. These 
characteristics often required unique methods and techniques for dealing with the EPLRS 
program. An assumption that is made assumes that the methods and techniques referred 
to would not readily apply to most other programs. 
The EPLRS system evolved from the recently developed Marine Corps 
system, PLRS. This resulted in the system having some previously developed 
components and software. The computer language, CMS2, and the system expertise for 
this type system were familiar products to the Marine Corps and Navy. As a result, this 
fact drove many of the software support decisions, such as the selection of an IV&V 
agent and PDSS organization. 
Because EPLRS was an enhancement from an already developed system, the 
complexity of the remaining development was underestimated [Ref. 31]. This proved to 
be a driving force behind the accelerated schedule and level o~ concurrency in the 
original acquisition program strategy. It that led to system problems and also drove 
many decisions during corrective action. These included adopting a more conservative 
program acquisition strategy and developing better simulation and analysis tools. These 
needs had not been forecasted earlier. 
EPLRS was also unique in that it was a communication "pipeline" for several 
battlefield data systems also currently under development. EPLRS was considered the 
"linchpin 11 for this high priority network of Anny data systems grouped under ATC CS 
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[Ref. 28:p. l]. This fact may have been responsible for the level of concern and 
oversight involvement the program saw after its poor performance in TT-II. The 
involvement and support of high level authorities may have afforded the EPLRS 
corrective action program a level of clout and resource priority not always available to 
other programs. 
One other characteristic that may be viewed as unique is the fact that EPLRS 
had breached its baseline and went through a program restructuring. While restructuring 
can happen to other programs, it may warrant corrective actions that may not be feasible 
for programs that have not breached baseline. The level of effort and cost that resulted 
in the EPLRS corrective action plan would probably not be available to program that had 
software problems but maintained baseline integrity. The issue in this case is perhaps 
a question of scale. 
These issues are those that are the most unique to the EPLRS program. They 
have had an effect on corrective action program decisions and may not apply to other 
programs. These characteristics will limit the applicability of lessons learned in the 
EPLRS case. 
2. Common Characteristics of the EPLRS Case 
Outside of the characteristics listed above, the EPLRS case has several issues 
in common with other software intensive programs that have experienced software 
development problems. The program entered formal Government technical testing with 
immature software that could not fully satisfy requirements. It is a system that relies 
heavily on software to accomplish its mission. Software was in the critical path of the 
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system's development plan. EPLRS is required to interface with several other battlefield 
systems and has numerous human interface requirements. Perhaps most significantly, 
EPLRS was managed by Government and contractor program offices that were faced 
with serious decisions after identifying critical software shortfalls in their system. To see 
how common these characteristics really are one need only review the GAO reports that 
cover software problems in major defense weapon systems. Not withstanding the unique 
characteristics of the EPLRS system, many of the lessons learned from the EPLRS 
corrective action case can be applied to other programs in a reasonable manner. 
D. APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED TO OTHER PROGRAMS 
This section presents a list of corrective action lessons learned that were 
generalized from the EPLRS case analysis. Following the logic of the previous section, 
these lessons learned should be applicable to software intensive programs that encounter 
software development difficulties. 
1. Ensure software corrective action plans are designed to meet the requirements and 
expectations of those parties that oversee the program. This refers to the user 
community and the chain of responsibility of the program. 
2. Maintaining the confidence of the TSM and higher level authority throughout a 
corrective action plan is critical. Without the TSM and decision making authority 
having confidence that the plan can viably correct the software problems, the program 
has little chance of survival. 
3. Corrective action in software intensive programs normally warrants a shift to a 
more conservative strategy. An incremental, deliberate approach can better address 
the risk inherent in this situation. 
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4. Corrective action on software in a system should be isolated from any 
simultaneous attempt to enhance or otherwise engineer changes into the software. 
The focus of the corrective action should only be the existing deficiencies. 
5. If a contractor's software process capability is questionable request an independent 
technical assessment of that process. The SEI's software capability maturity model 
is a good format to use. 
6. Ensure there is a contractor plan to incorporate recommendations from the 
technical assessment into the software and firmware process for the program. 
7. Where appropriate, contractual clauses can be used to reduce Government risk 
during software corrective action. An example would be the EPLRS contract clauses 
stipulating that system demonstrations had to be successful before future contracts 
options would be awarded. 
8. Corrective action requires iterative testing to confinn software maturity. This 
occurs as consecutive tests identify and correct more problems and the software 
reliability increases. The TAAF methodology provides an exhaustive testing plan 
commensurate with the task and level of risk normally presented by a program 
requiring corrective action. 
9. Early Government involvement and support in corrective action better prepares 
contractors for follow-on Government testing. Government participation can reduce 
requirements confusion, improve user satisfaction, enhance communications, and 
provide Government test expertise to contractor test personnel. 
10. The scope of contractor software testing must replicate the actual environments 
and scenarios to be encountered at Government testing. 
11. Requiring interim demonstrations during the test cycle provides the Government 
PM with progress points to track program progress. Used in an event-based program 
strategy, these interim milestones can reduce the risk in making Government 
program decisions. 
12. An on-site Government office at the contractor's facility gives the PM a 
significant advantage in managing corrective action of the software and firmware on 
a daily basis. 
13. Put the agency most experienced in the system's software in the IV&V role for 
the program. The IV&V personnel must be able to see problems not detected by the 
developer. Strong IV&V and software system experience provides the intuitive 
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insight and appreciation for problem areas needed to effectively perform the IV&V 
role. 
14. The team concept for contractors, where software personnel are assigned to the 
program office, is more effective than matrix type support. 
15 · Maintaining control of a corrective action plan requires frequent updates and 
communications. A reliable, informal communication system with the contractor is 
essential. 
16. Open sharing of information between the Government and the contractor 
improves decision making and reduces surprises on both sides. 
17. Government-contractor cooperation is critical to a smooth corrective action plan. 
18. Corporate involvement is necessary to provide the priority support required of 
an intensive corrective action plan. 
E. SUMMARY 
No single action or "silver bullet" made the EPLRS corrective action plan, PSV, 
a success. Productive involvement by many key players combined to make PSV work. 
Careful analysis and planning designed a program that would effectively correct the 
system's software and firmware and properly manage the risk involved. Conservative 
and disciplined testing efforts and managerial control over the program overcame the 
difficulties of correcting software in such a complex system. These factors combined 
with the good working relationship of the Government and Hughes Aircraft Company 
were responsible for the success of the EPLRS corrective action. 
While the EPLRS system has some unique characteristics, it has enough 
commonality with most other software intensive systems to be helpful as a case study. 
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The lessons derived from the EPLRS analysis should be applicable to many similar 
systems. 
The next chapter will provide conclusions to the EPLRS case study. It will also 
provide a set of recommendations related to the lessons learned in this chapter. 
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VIl. CONCLUSIONS AND REC01\.1MENDA TIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Titls chapter will begin by presenting conclusions to the research effort. The 
conclusions will be followed by a set of general recommendations to be considered as 
possible ways to improve the acquisition of software intensive systems by DOD. The 
chapter will also include answers to the thesis questions used in this research effort. 
Recommendations for further study will be included at the end of the chapter. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The opening chapters of this thesis described the critical role software plays in 
today's defense weapon systems. The vast majority of these systems rely on complex 
software that is very challenging to develop and absolutely essential to each system's 
performance. The development of this software involves millions of source lines of code 
and costs billions of dollars annually. Additionally, it is a fact that high levels of risk 
and a high probability of encountering problems are inherent in today's software 
development environment. Recent estimates show that 7 out of 10 major weapon systems 
currently in development are encountering software problems [Ref. 11]. 
In this environment program offices of software intensive systems must be prepared 
to address problems they are likely to face in development. Ideally, programs should be 
proactively focused in an effort to avoid software developmental problems. Yet, the 
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statistical probability of developmental problems occurring is relatively high. Therefore, 
an astute program office should be prepared to implement and manage a software 
corrective action plan. Likewise, the DOD environment should support and facilitate the 
efforts necessary to effectively correct the software system shortfalls. 
The EPLRS case studied in this paper . presents an example of successful 
management of a software correctiv~ action plan. The planning and management of the 
PSV program by both the Government and Hughes Aircraft Company effectively 
corrected the problems with the EPLRS system. The program efforts were completed 
within given cost and schedule constraints and satisfied higher level authorities and the 
user community. The reason this corrective action plan succeeded was because it was 
well designed and effectively managed. 
The sound decisions and prudent actions of both the Government and the contractor 
resulted in mature system software prepared for future Government testing. The 
corrective action strategy and management techniques used in PSV were responsible for 
minimizing Government risk, maintaining a sense of teamwork between the Government 
and the contractor, and increasing the chance of program survival. Overall, the PSV 
program presented a timely, effective, and efficient corrective action plan that allowed 
a program to successfully continue with its acquisition strategy. 
The lessons learned in the EPLRS case can be applied to other software intensive 
systems in DOD that are experiencing software problems. There are some unique 
characteristics in the EPLRS case that set it apart from other programs. Yet, the vast 
majority of circumstances and learning points involved in the correction of EPLRS 
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software and fmnware are common to the DOD procurement environment. Therefore, 
the lessons learned can be readily generalized to a large population of software intensive 
systems being developed by DOD. The design concept and management techniques used 
in the EPLRS case may senre as models for the design and implementation of software 
corrective action required by other DOD weapon systems. 
Lastly, this thesis considered the actions of a single case, the EPLRS program. 
Studying only a single case naturally reduces the external validity of the results. In the 
case of corrective software management in the EPLRS program, the concepts analyzed 
seem readily generalizable to a large population of DOD programs. While the conclusion 
is that the lessons from this case are applicable to many DOD programs, the limitations 
of the single case study should be noted. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are a result of this research. 
1. Develop a DOD Policy on Management of Software Corrective Action 
The lack of an effective software corrective action plan can prolong 
developmental problems in a weapon system and cause significant cost, schedule, and 
performance shortfalls. In many cases, software problems affecting the development of 
a weapon system may not be properly addressed in an effort to avoid visibility. Still 
other systems may have software problems for which the corrective action is 
underestimated. In the case of EPLRS, serious software problems were not identified 
until technical testing. Ideally, critical software problems would be identified earlier in 
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the development process. A measurements program, such as the Army's STEP metrics, 
would assist in identifying such problems earlier. 
A DOD policy is needed that encourages a consistent approach to effectively 
manage the corrective action of software problems. The policy should promote 
conservative methodologies, such as TAAF, and emphasize comprehensive risk 
management in the corrective action plans. It should address the subject of schedule 
readjustment and baseline breach. Guidance should be to complete corrective action 
before further system development involving software is attempted. A major intent of 
the policy should be to remove any potential threat PMs may perceive exists in expanding 
a program schedule to allow for the correction of software problems. 
2. Develop a DOD Model for Software Corrective Action 
A general model of a software corrective action plan would facilitate the 
implementation of corrective action by program offices. Different models may be 
developed for various categories of defense systems that benefit from a tailored software 
corrective action plan. These differences may involve testing requirements, availability 
of test assets, scheduling of corrective action events, etc. 
The corrective action model should address identification of root cause and 
test methodology. While the methodology, as a rule, should be conservative, it should 
also be flexible enough to be tailored to a program's needs. The model should also 
address risk management through required interim progress demonstrations, 
comprehensive verification and regression testing, and involvement of Government users 
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and testers to clarify requirements and verify test environments. The use of such models 
will also promote some standardization for Government and contractor program offices. 
3. Use Separate Contractual Efforts for Corrective Action 
When possible, software corrective actions should be conducted under 
separate contractual efforts (this includes contract modifications). This provides for a 
clearly defined scope of the required action. Its own statement of work and list of 
deliverables clearly define the tasks to be accomplished in the corrective action. The 
contract can be used to appropriately share the risk between the Government and the 
contractor. Special provision clauses can reduce fiscal exposure of the Government by 
stipulating successful demonstrations of required performance before payments or 
approval of follow-on contract events. A contract provides a tool necessary to control 
the corrective action for the Government. 
4. Use of On-Site Program Office Personnel during Corrective Action 
The use of on-site software technicians provided an indispensable asset for 
the PM during software corrective action. The level of monitoring of software testing 
and engineering significantly increases during corrective action plans. Additionally, 
meetings and reporting requirements increase. The use of on-site personnel is the most 
effective way to meet these requirements and keep the main Government program office 
updated on all activities. These on-site personnel also provide a useful liaison role for 
the contractor. In many cases, approvals, advice, and decisions can be made 
immediately by on-site personnel. This avoids delays from waiting on periodic visits 
from program office personnel or the inevitable delays that result from passing 
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documentation back and forth between program management offices. This also facilitates 
the IV&V mission. On-site IV&V representatives can provide close, daily supervision 
of all software efforts. These personnel can accommodate the increased close monitoring 
necessary during corrective action of a systems' software. 
D. ANSWERS TO THESIS QUESTIONS 
1. How can a PM: most effectively manage software corrective action to solve 
problems that develop in the software acquisition process? 
A PM can approach corrective action required for software in a number of 
different ways and be successful. Each program situation presents a different set of 
requirements and constraints that corrective action must be tailored to. The EPLRS case 
shows one successful corrective action plan. The general concepts drawn from this case 
attempt to answer this thesis question. These concepts proved successful for the EPLRS 
program and can be applied to other programs as well. Applying these concepts to other 
programs needing software corrective action will assist in generating the actual tasks for 
that specific case. 
The general concepts developed from studying the EPLRS corrective action 
case are as follows: 
• Understand what the user community and decision authority want from the 
corrective action plan. Maintain their confidence. 
• Establish a comprehensive risk management effort for the corrective action plan. 
This characterizes the plan itself. 
• Isolate the corrective action effort from other program efforts. This simplifies the 
tasks, ensuring better error correction and configuration management. 
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• Keep the operational testers involved early in the corrective action plan. 
• Use a test methodology that exhaustively tests the systems and each of its 
parameters. The test analyze and fix methodology works very well. 
• Use field testing to accurately replicate the operational environment of the system. 
• Keep the user involved in technical testing. 
• Establish an on-site office for Government program management personnel. It 
improves the oversight role of the software technicians and the IV & V personnel. 
• Work to establish and maintain good relations with the contractor. The corrective 
action effort is facilitated by teamwork between the Government and contractor 
program offices. 
• Establish an open and frequent communications channel from the contractor site to 
the PM office. This infonnation flow is critical. 
• Look for corporate involvement from the contractor. It can provide significant 
support and priority to the contractor PM. In corrective action programs this is 
often essential for success. 
2. How can the organizational structure of the contractor and Government 
program management offices facilitate the software corrective action plan? 
Both the Government and the contractor can tailor their program offices to 
better fit the needs of a corrective action plan. The use of an on-site office by the 
Government PM can greatly increase the oversight capability and infonnation flow to the 
home office. Increasing the software technicians in both Government and contractor 
offices is critical during this type of work. The increased test and analysis, often 
conducted at a faster pace than nonnal, will require more technicians to execute it and 
oversee it. This will also increase the IV&V role. The goal of the structural change 
should be to get the expertise and actions where they are needed most. 
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3. What is the P.M's relationship with the contractor in correcting software 
deficiencies? 
Higher risk and pressure are inherent in any corrective action program. An 
adverse relationship in this type of an environment can be detrimental to the program. 
Teamwork between the Government and contractor program offices is very important to 
implementing a corrective action plan. Open and cooperative relations help in problem 
solving and decision making between both parties. This is facilitated by agreeing to 
share all information between the program offices. Both the Government and contractor 
PMs have to fully and actively support the teamwork philosophy. An open and frequent 
information flow keeps both PMs better informed and reduces unwanted surprises. This 
relationship is further improved by positive and supportive corporate involvement. This 
involvement facilitates the corrective action and improves the confidence of the 
Government that the contractor is committed to the corrective action of the system. 
4. How is risk management addressed by the P.M office in a software 
corrective action plan? 
As stated earlier, an effective corrective action plan is characterized by risk 
management. All major actions in the plan should be considered in the context of risk 
management. 
The corrective action plan should have a narrow scope focused on clearly 
identifying the software problems and designing a plan to fix only those problems. The 
testing plan should be designed as a conservative, iterative effort that allows careful 
analysis and correction between tests. Contractual actions can be used to reduce 
Government risk and protect the Government's fiscal exposure through special provision 
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clauses. Independent technical assessments of the contractor's software capability can 
be conducted if it is questioned. These are only a few of actions that can help manage 
risk. But risk management in corrective action is critical and must be strongly 
emphasized throughout the plan. 
5. What information reporting system allows the PM to best monitor the 
progress and manage the actions of a corrective actions plan? 
The information flow to the Government PM becomes even more important 
when conducting corrective action. Status is needed more often, reports to higher 
authority are often required more often, and critical decisions may be required more 
frequently. This requires an accurate and frequent flow of information between the 
contractor facility and the PM office. The standard information and reporting channels 
often do not satisfy this information requirement well. Agreements between the 
contractor and Government PM for the sharing of information and reports can facilitate 
this need. The sharing of information between the PMs is critical to decision making and 
is best implemented by agreed methods of communication. This may take the form of 
E-mail, fax messages, minutes to internal meetings, and sharing of internal reports, to 
name a few. The on-site Government office can also provide a consistent, daily flow of 
information and reports to the PM. This office can act as a liaison for gathering 
information from the contractor and providing the contractor the same from the 
Government PM. 
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6. How can contractual considerations be used to manage software 
corrective action? 
· The contract gives the Government PM a tool to better control the corrective 
action plan and effectively manage the risk. The contract action can be negotiated as a 
separate contract or a modification to a current contract. The scope and statement of 
work (SOW) provide a manner for the PM to clearly define the goals, constraints, 
boundaries, and criteria for the corrective action. 
The contract can be used to shift risk from the Government to the contractor 
when warranted. Special provisions clauses can motivate the contractor by tieing the 
award of future program events to the success of system demonstrations. Progress 
payments can also be made dependent of successful demonstration of system 
performance. 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1. DOD Policy on Correction of Software Problems 
Examine the need for a DOD policy addressing the proper management of 
software development problems. The "software crisis", as it has been called, presents 
problems throughout the DOD procurement arena. The impact on cost, schedule and 
performance across DOD warrants policy that promotes an effective manner of dealing 
with these software problems. The study may consider the opinions of current PMs and 
PEOs service-wide, the opinions of contractors, the potential long range impact on cost 
and schedule, and what barriers may exist to such a policy. 
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2. Role of Contracts in Software Corrective Action 
Examine how contractual efforts can be used by the Government to better 
manage software corrective action plans. The contractual actions for a software 
corrective action plan have a significant impact on the risk assumed by the Government. 
Contracts can be tailored to have a variety of effects. This research can examine risk 
sharing between the Government and the contractor. It may also study the role of 
contract incentives, and the when the use of different contract types provide an advantage 
to the PM. 
3. Model for Software Corrective Action Programs 
Develop a model for software corrective action to be used by DOD program 
offices experiencing software developmental problems. The focus should be on a model 
or series of models that would address the common requirements of any system needing 
corrective action. The study may include discussion of when a corrective action plan 
should be initiated and what type programs may need a special model. Additionally, the 
research would have to determine how the model would assist both the Government and 
the contractor. 
4. EPLRS Follow-on Development 
Examine the software challenges in the product improvement phase of the 
EPLRS program that followed PSV. Hughes learned many lessons from the PSV 
program in terms of software development and testing. Many of these lessons learned 
carried over into the next phase of the program. The research could examine how the 
PSV program influenced follow-on testing of software and system equipment. The team 
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concept has remained in Hughes program offices. This could also be studied for its 
impact on the follow-on phase. An overall assessment of improved effectiveness in the 
EPLRS program from the PSV software lessons lea.med could be the focus of the study. 
5. More Studies in Management of Software Corrective Action 
Examine the history of other programs that have faced challenges in 
correcting software problems. The scope of this thesis was limited to the EPLRS 
program. Studying the success or inability of other programs to effectively manage 
corrective software action can expand the understanding of the topic. Areas of interest 
would include other techniques used to effectively manage the corrective action and 
programs that managed corrective action without breaching baseline or restructuring the 
program. Also, programs that did not effectively manage corrective action may offer 
insight to the motivations and situation that cause that to happen. 
F. A FINAL THOUGHT 
A barrier to the effective use of this case as a model is the pressure to succeed in 
the DOD procurement environment. Programs that have breached their baseline, like 
EPLRS, customarily restructure themselves and design focused corrective action plans. 
Programs that have not breached baseline but are still experiencing serious software 
deficiencies are driven by different pressures. The desire to maintain low visibility and 
meet originally planned program schedules may motivate a program manager to try and 
correct serious software deficiencies in conjunction with current program actions. This 
may work in certain situations. But the effect of adding corrective action tasks to those 
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of a development process already in progress is to reduce the effectiveness of both 
actions and only add additional complexity. 
The DOD procurement environment must be adapted to encourage the most 
effective approach to correcting software problems. The pressures of the procurement 
system that motivate PMs to defer the proper corrective action of software problems 
delay the maturity of the software and the system itself. This often results in operational 
test problems, delays in fielding, and significant cost and schedule overruns. When its 
execution is viable, timely and focused corrective action can avoid these problems. 
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APPENDIX A. EPLRS CONTRACT SPECIAL PROVISIONS CLAUSES 
SECTION H. Special Provisions 
Contract No. DAAB07-83-C-J031 
Modification No. POOlOO 
Page 14 of 119 
H.307 Conduct of the proposed correction of technical test deficiencies is 
contingent on availability of a full complement of Government furnished test 
instrumentation (Hardware/Software) and data reduction software at the Contractor's 
facility for the duration of the PSV activities. This must include capability to 
build/modify scenarios at Fullerton. Each item must be accompanied by installation, 
usage, and version description documentation, as applicable. If this documentation 
does not exist for an item, then on-site support at Fullerton from knowledgeable 
personnel shall be provided by the Government during the PSV activities. 
H.308 Any scenarios, test instrumentation, and/or data reduction software shall 
be under configuration management disciplines equivalent to the EPLRS Development 
Program during the PSV activities at Fullerton. Any changes to these items 
subsequent to PSV activities are subject to prior approval by the DA. 
H.309 Technical representatives from both EPG and COMARCO shall be 
provided at the Contractor's facility to support instrumentation and data reduction for 
the duration of the PSV activities. 
H.310 All EPLRS equipment transferred from Ft. Huachuca to Fullerton shall 
remain in Government custody for duration of PSV activities at the Contractor's 
facility. Authorization is granted on a case by case basis by the Government RTR to 
permit installation of temporary modifications in the Government Furnished Property 
for purposed of test evaluation. Syste1:11 baseline will be established prior to formal 
field demo. 
H.311 The NCS shelter may be shipped without nameplate and nomenclature 
since new nomenclature has not yet been assigned. Nomenclature will be assigned 
during P31, Phase C, if awarded. 
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SECTION H. Special Provisions 
Contract No. DAAB07-83-C-J031 
Modification No. POOlOO 
Page 14 of 119 
H.312 The drawing delivery is limited to the new drawings prepared for the PSV 
program. The delivery shall be microfilm aperture cards. Diazo Type 2 Class 2 
made from Hughes microfilm CDRL 03AT developed under DAAB-82-J096 contract. 
H.313 Formal regression/verification of design modification changes will be 
demonstrated at the system level in lieu of individual regression tests for each change. 
H.314 The contractor shall be authorized by the RTR on a case by case basis to 
utilize EPLRS P3I assets (if Phase C awarded) to replace PSV GFP failures when 
PLRS/GFP (DAAB07-83-C-J031) assets are exhausted. 
H.315 Any training material that was revised by Th1MI shall be furnished to the 
Contractor by the Government NLT 30 days after execution of the syscon training 
option. 
H.316 Redline technical manuals will be used to support course preparation. 
Draft manuals reflecting PSV configuration changes will be utilized during course 
conduct. 
H.317 At minimum, one student station will be utilized for spare parts to support 
hardware maintenance of the trainer. 
H.318 Any failed Megatek or Sun Microsystems circuit cards will be replaced 
with existing trainer assets. 
H.319 During actual conduct of training, only hardware maintenance support of 
the trainer will be provided. However, any software or exercise failures that are 
determined critical by the Government to training will be processed immediately. 
H.320 The latest date that the option may be exercised by is Oct 1989. 
H.321 The IC Demo Report generated by the Contractor is due within 30 days 
after receipt of Government reduced data from the IC Demo. If IC Demo Report is 
submitted late to the Government, the PCO may reduce progress payments on the 
PSV program. 
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SECTION H. Special Provisions 
Contract No. DAAB07-83-C-J031 
Modification No. POOlOO 
Page 14 of 119 
H.322 If the Contractor fails the IC Demo, the PCO may stop the PSV program 
progress payments. The Contractor shall analyze the failures and make corrections as 
required to pass the IC Demo to the Government's satisfaction, at no change to the 
firm-fixed price. 
H.323 If the Contractor fails the PSV Field Demo, the Contractor shall analyze 
the failures and make corrections as required to pass the PSV Field Demo to the 
Government's satisfaction, at no change to the firm-fixed price. 
H.324 The Contractor must successfully pass, as evidenced by written approval 
fonn the PCO, the Inter/Intra Community (IC) Needline Demonstration in order to 
obtain authorization to implement First Article Test (FAT) requirements under Phase 
C of this contract if awarded. 
H.325 The Contractor must successfully pass, as evidenced by written approval 
of test report by PCO, the PSV Demonstration in order for Option 1 of Phase C (if 
awarded) to be exercised. Failure to pass the PSV Demonstration will delay 
authorization of Option I, but will not be cause for any additional cost or delivery 
schedule delay when Option I of Phase C is exercised. 
H.326 The PSV equipment must successfully pass the Technical Test (Phase 3) as 
evidenced by written approval by the PCO, in order for Option 2 of Phase C (if 
awarded) to be exercised. Failure to pass the Technical Test will delay authorization 
of Option 2, but will not be cause for any additional cost or delivery schedule delay 





















APPENDIX B. LIST OF ACRONYMS 
Acquisition Category 
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System 
Anny Materiel System Analysis Activity 
Anny System Acquisition Review Council 
All Source Analysis System 
Anny Tactical Command and Control System 
Advanced Tactical Fighter 
bits per second 
Cost/Schedule Control System Criteria 
Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence 
Communication-Electronic Command 
California Field Office 
Communication 
Center for Software Engineering 
Department of the Anny 
Department of Defense 
Deputy Under Secretary of the Anny (Operations Research) 
Electronic Counter Measure 
























Electronic Proving Ground 
Enhanced Position Location Reporting System 
Enhanced PLRS User Unit 
Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control, and Intelligence 
First Article Test 
Field Test 
General Accounting Office 
Inter Community 
Initial Operational Capability 
Initial Operational Test and Evaluation 
In Progress Review 
Independent Verification and Validation 
Joint Tactical Information Distribution System 
Low Rate Initial Production 
Manpower and Personnel Integration 
Mission Critical Computer Resources 
Maneuver Control System 
Marine Corp Tactical Software Support Agency 
Net Control Station 
Net Control Station - EPLRS 
Over the Air Rekey 
























Post Deployment Software Support 
Program Executive Officer 
PLRS-JTIDS Hybrid 
Position Location Reporting System 
Project/Product Manager 
Program Management Office 
Prototype Qualification Test - Contractor 
Prototype Qualification Test - Government 
Production System Verification 
Program Trouble Report 
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 
Software Engineering Division 
Software Engineering Institute 
Source Lines of Code 
Statement of Work 
Test Analyze and Fix 
Time Division Multiple Access 
Test and Evaluation Command 
Test and Evaluation Master Plan 
Training and Doctrine Command 
TRADOC System Manager 
Technical Test Il 
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UHF IDtra-High Frequency 
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APPENDIX C. LIST OF PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED 
1. Guenther, 0., MG, USA, Commander, Communications-Electronics Command, 
Fort Monmouth, NJ, Interview by mail, February 1994. 
2. Fomecker, C., LTC, USA, Defense Systems Management College, Fort 
Belvoir, VA, Interview, June 1993. 
3. Frith, S., LTC, USA, Product Manager, Enhanced Position Location Reporting 
System, Fort Monmouth, NJ, Interview, November 1993. 
4. Emery, L., Deputy Product Manager, Enhanced Position Location Reporting 
System, Fort Monmouth, NJ, Interview, June 1993. 
5. Lynn, S., Software Engineer, Enhanced Position Location Reporting System, 
Fort Monmouth, NJ, Interview, June 1993. 
6. Wickstrom, P., Software Engineer, Marine Corp Tactical Software Support 
Agency, Camp Pendleton, CA, Interviews, August and September 1993. 
7. Reska, R., Systems Engineer, Mitre Corporation, Fullerton, CA, Interviews, 
September and November 1993. 
8. Luisi, G., Systems Engineer, Mitre Corporation, Eatontown, NJ, Interview, 
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